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PREFACE
The ground work for this study was done while the author was a member
of a World Bank mission which visited Korea at the end of 1983. The study was
perceived as another application of the analytical work presented in "The
Nature of Credit Markets in Developing Countries: A Framework for Policy
Analysis," (Staff Working Paper No. 524). The first application of the work
was presented in, "Evaluation of Financial Policy: Credit Allocation in
Bangladesh." The current study therefore tried to put greater emphasis on
issues not present in Bangladesh or ones which were relatively neglected in
that study. The most important of the latter were securities markets and the
micro impacts on the financial system of monetary policy. As a result some of
the issues which were extensively covered in the earlier study, such as the
detailed effect of a large number of specific allocation instruments including
specialized banks, have not been covered in depth.
ABSTRACT
Direction and control of the financial system has had a significant
role in the Korean government's development strategy. The paper shows how
this influenced the evolution of the Korean financial system, and how the
latter responded to shocks during the 1980s. Review of the Korean experience
also suggests two important hypotheses: that subsidy policies (not interest
ceilings) directed solely at promoting market and economic efficiency are more
likely to be successful, and that forced lending policies (often combined with
interest ceilings) directed at social, political and other non-economic goals
are likely to weaken the financial system and be much less likely to
succeed. Given the nature of this study, however, its conclusions, like that
of other similar studies, should be considered only tentative in the absence
of rigorous empirical testing.
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1. Introduction
Direction and Control of the financial system has had a significant
role in the Korean Government's development strategy. In the 1960s credit and
interest rate policy was merely one among a host of tax, tariff and import
concessions to exporting industries. With the reduction and elimination of
some of these concessions in the 1970s, and the perceived need to change the
structure of the economy, the financial system began by the mid-1970s, to have
a much more central role in development strategy. Broadly speaking the
structure of financial regulation had three elements: The creation of new
public and private financial institutions with specified limitations on the
type of activities, control of the level and structure of interest rates, and
direct and indirect credit allocation policies. The primary focus of this
paper is to study the evolution of Korean financial markets under this
regulatory regime, and to analyse how they responded to external shocks and
internal policy changes in the 1980s. This experience suggests lessons which
may be of use to other countries with similarly regulated financial systems.
The analysis shows that both the identification/choice of sectors and
uses for increased allocation of capital, and the instruments used for this
purpose can have profound effects on the evolution of the financial system.
In both these areas, mistakes which seem to predominate in many other
countries with strong regulatory structures, were relatively rare in Korea,
but not entirely absent. For example, one possible reason for relatively
greater success, in the choice of favored uses for funds, is a much greater
emphasis on economic returns, rather than on equity/distributional
considerations (or even worse, political pressure). Mistakes can,_and did
- 2 -
arise even in judging the uses for which long-term economic benefits were
greater than those perceived by lenders (i.e. in identifying market failure).
Incentive Mechanisms and Forced Lending policies, the two broadly
defined categories of intervention instruments, were both used in Korea. As
in the case of many other countries, Korea demonstrates the grave risks in
using forced lending policies. The most important risk is the potential
undermining of the profitability and viability of the financial system,
particularly the banking system. This is not to say, as many have that no
good can come out of a regulated system; by changing private profits from
different types of lending, it can encourage socially profitable innovation in
new instruments and markets. Direct incentives can, however, usually achieve
the same results at lower cost and risk. Similarly incentives mechanisms like
subsidized rediscounting and credit guarantee mechanisms have quite different
consequences from forced lending policies.
Loan interest rate ceilings are almost always an essential element of
the forced lending policies. They also have a pervasive influence on the
development of the financial structure. The paper therefore starts with an
examination of recent interest policies, and demonstrates a simple methodology
for determining an appropriate interest rate structure. In the succeeding
sections it is shown how failings in this structure affected the evolution of
the financial system. At least in Korea, management of the level of loan
interest in the face of changing conditions in money markets has been quite
successful. Other countries can learn from this experience.
In the final section we consider the reactions of this financial
system to external shocks and the governments macroeconomic (mainly monetary)
policy response to this shock. The constraints imposed by the financial
-3-
system, and the role of the informal or curb market (which is itself largely a
consequence of the regulated structure) in modifying the effects of financial
policy is analysed.
Section 2. Interest-Rate Policy
Interest rate policy enters into consideration of, and effects
virtually all financial sector issues. It is therefore useful to first
consider it separately. The issue in my view is not one of government control
versus (idealized) competitive rate setting, but one of the appropriate level
and structure of rates. For this purpose it is instructive to look at the
recent experience in Korea.
2.1 Loan Rates: Appropriate Level and Flexibility
Columns B to E of Appendix Table Al give a sampling of the loan rates
of the deposit money banks, which were subject to varying degrees of
government control and advise. The ones given are the interest rate on
overdue loans, the rate on overdrafts, call market rate and the rate on bills
and discounts for A class enterprises. Figure 1 shows the general time
pattern of variation in these rates. The table reveals a striking difference
in the behavior of these rates in the 10 quarter period ending in the fourth'
quarter of 1979 and that beginning in 1980 (lst quarter). All these rates
were much less volatile (flexible) in the first period than in the second.
For example, the coefficient of variation for the discount rates on bills was
10.4X in the first and 17.5% in the second period. Similarly the variation in
the call rate was 5.5X in the first and 15.4X in the second period.
FIGURE 1: AVERAGE QUARTERLY INTEREST RATES
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This behavior seems to contrast with that of the two rates, which are
generally thought to be reasonably free. The interest rate in the curb (UFM)
markets and the yield on corporate bonds. There is no superficially visible
difference in their behavior before and after the first quarter of 1980
(Columns A and I). Comparison of the coefficient of variation for the curb
market rates reveals, however, that there was an equal if not greater change
in the variability of this rate. The coefficient of variations went from 9.8%
in the first to 17.7% in the second period. This suggests that the government
behavior changed from making larger discrete changes to smaller quicker
changes after the oil shocks. There is clearly a trade off between stability
and responsiveness to market conditions and government policy correctly
changed towards the quicker responsiveness required to reflect market
conditions.
The secondary bond market, because of its limited nature (discussed
below) and the curb market, because of its quasi-illegal status, suffer from
limitations, as reflections of the supply-demand conditions in financial
markets. An examination of Row 6 of Table 1 shows however, that during the
first shock period (1980-1 to 1982-2) the correlation between the bond yield
and the lagged curb rate at 0.88 was significantly higher than the same period
correlation or the correlation between the curb rate and the lagged bond
yield. This leads to the conclusion that curb rates had an influence in
determining bond yields and that the reverse effect was minimal. It also
suggests that the curb market reflects market conditions better.
The first column of Table 1 shows the same period correlation between
the curb interest rate and the bills discount rate, the 1 year time deposit
rate for DMBs and the bond yield rate. As we might expect the curb markets
- 6 -
Table 1: Correlation Between Interest Rates (1980-lst to 1982-2nd quarter)L/
1. UFM Rate 2. UFM Rate 3. UFM Rate2V 4. Corporate 5. Lagged 6. Bond2/
Lagged Bond Bond Yield
Yield Yield
1. Overdue loans 0.83 0.52 0.29
2. Overdrafts 0.53 0.89 0.14
3. Call Market 0.93 0.91 0.51
(-0.10)
4. Gen. Bills 0.89 0.89 0.47 0.94 0.74 0.73
& Loans (0.86) (0.75)
5. 1 Yr.TD 0.84 0.85 0.46
6. Corporate 0.58 0.82 0.58
Bond
7. SIFC Deposit 0.80 0.92
Rates
1/ Figures in brackets are for period 1977-3rd to 1979-4th quarter.
2/ The numbers in this column represent correlation coefficient with the lagged
values of the rates referred to in the extreme left hand column.
Source: Calculated from Table Al.
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response to external factors such as inflation, was similar to that of the
government response in terms of the movement of controlled rates; while this
was much less true of bond markets. Columns 2 and 3 show that for the DMB's,
deposit and general loan rates were much more closely correlated with lagged
curb rates than curb rates were with lagged loan and deposit rates. This
suggests that the government used curb market rates, or other indicators
correlated with them, as measures of market excess demand. This information
was used in adjusting controlled rates. It is worth noting that if government
controlled rate changes were totally independent of economic changes which
effect supply-demand conditions in financial markets, we would expect a
negative correlation between the curb and bank rates. If the government
responded weakly or only part of the time, the correlation would be close to
zero.
2.2. Level of Interest Rates
Columns K and M of Table Al and Figure 2, show the ratio of general
bill discount to curb rate, and the 1 Yr time deposit rate to the curb rate.
The changes in the latter ratio and its effect on the portfolio shifts between
the curb market and deposit money banks will be analysed subsequently. The
table shows that adjustment of loan interest ceilings in early 1980 led to a
rise in the ratio from .43 to .55 by the 3rd quarter of 1980. The average
ratio rose from .42 during the period 1977-2 to 1979-4 to .517 during the
period 1980-1 to 1982-4. With the sharp downward adjustment in the loan rates
in June 1982 the ratio fell sharply from .43 in 1982-1 to .36 (.34) in the
next quarter (1982-2). But in early 1983 it had already recovered to between
.4 and .50 (the 1983 curb data is in different format from earlier data).
- 9 -
Curb interest rates continued to decline in the 3rd quarter with a temporary
increase in the 4th quarter. There was no sharp permanent increase (even
relative to the other rates). Any conclusions that the curb market is a
manifestation of a condition of chronic excess demand in the formal financial
system is highly exaggerated. l/ What the curb market does represent is a
segmentation arising from an inappropriate structure of interest rate
controls. The spread between average interest rate on bank loans to the
average interest rate on bank deposit is, however, of critical importance to
the banking system. We consider this below.
2.3 The Structure of Loan Interest Rates
Korea, like many other developing countries, has perceived interest
rate ceilings on specific types of loans and borrower groups as an instrument
of development policy. Appendix Table A2 gives a flavor of the types of loans
and discounts for which such ceilings have been used. Favored categories have
included loans for export industries, machine industry promotion, agriculture
and medium industries. The ostensible objective of such policies is to reduce
the effective cost of capital for favored uses. Their actual effect is to
increase collateral requirements and to reduce loan amounts to borrower
categories to which they really act as ceilings 2/. As this defeats the
entire purpose of the policy it is often coupled with implicit or explicit
forced lending policies. Such allocation policies will be considered
separately.
In the middle of 1982, the government of Korea unified the interest
ceilings on loans and deposits of Deposit Money Banks (DMBs), for the
ostensible purpose of eliminating such "subsidies": Loan and discount
- 10 -
ceilings were set at 10%, and deposit of ceilings at 8%. This of course had
the effect of eliminating desirable differentials by loan and deposit terms.
Paradoxically this represented a shift away from a policy of lower ceilings on
socially desirable activities and towards what might superficially be thought
of as socially unproductive sub-sectors. These were firms which from the
banks' perspective had suffered the greatest decline in the expected earnings
stream. The market rate of interest for such firms, in cases where banks
would want to continue lending, would be significantly higher than for general
loans.3/ Consequently the 10% rate would act as a more severe constraint.
The important issue in this context is not, however, one of socially
productive or unproductive sectors, but one of differentiation of interest
rates by borrower risk class. This is of course part of the general problem
of differentiating the structure of interest rate by the Return/Risk
characteristics of borrowers, and by loan size and maturity.
Return/Risk Characteristics
It can be shown 4/ that the profitability or expected returns of the
borrower will be negatively related to the interest rate on loans. The best
borrowers will not need any collateral, and pay an interest equal to the cost
to intermediaries of obtaining and transferring funds. In Korea the interest
rate on general bills and discounts of A class borrowers can be taken as this
base or prime rate. The ceilings on borrowers with worse return-risk
characteristics must rise progressively. Till mid-1970 the interest ceiling
on B class borrowers was 1.1(%) point above that of A class, and was reduced
to 0.5(X) point at that time. Even the 1 point difference was not adequate at
that time, representing less than a 7X spread over the prevailing A-class rate
of 15%. Table 2 shows that the average curb-rate for B-class borrowers was
21% higher than that of A-class borrowers in the third quarter of 1983. A
spread of 15 to 25% for B-class borrowers over the prime rate would not
therefore be inappropriate. Such spreads should in principle be applied to
all intermediaries and instruments .5/
Table 2: Curb Market Interest Rates in 1983
(in percent per annum)
March June September
A Class 19.6-21.0 21.0-22.4
(20.3) (21.7)
B Class 23.9-25.3 23.9-25.3 26.8-28.3
(24.6) (24.6) (27.5)
Figures in brackets represent simple averages.
Source: Investment & Finance Association of Korea
Loan Term and Size
Since 1976 the interest on loans of less than 1 year and those of .1
to 3 years has been virtually identical, with interest rate on loans of 3 to 8
years generally one percentage point above these rates. The differential for
the longer category has therefore been between 6.7% and 4.2% higher than the
shorter term category which ranged from 16% to 25.5% (Table A3). This would
appear to be a totally inadequate differentiation which was itself eliminated
in June 1982. If we look at the coefficient of variation for the relatively
more stable period 1977, 3rd quarter, to 1980, 1st quarter, it was
- 12 -
approximately 10% for both the general bills rate and for the curb market
rate. This suggests that range allowed was inadequate even in the earlier
period. An examination of the loan maturity structure of commercial banks
(Table A4) suggests a word of caution, however. A regression of the ratio of
the loan rates for 3-8 year loans to that of less than 3 year loans on the
proportion of loans of over 3 years maturity yields a weak negative
relationship. This would suggest that no differentiation is necessary.
Nevertheless, in my judgment, a difference in ceiling of 5% for the 1-3 years
over that for 1 year loans and a further 5% for 3-8 years loans seems to be
the minimum useful amount. An alternative would be to set bands of 0-10% for
each of these categories.
An often overlooked subcategory in most discussions of
differentiation by maturity is the problem of very short duration
loans/discounts. One of the important features of these loans is that they
must be processed and disbursed quickly. This usually requires greater
flexibility and decentralization of authority than most banks have and these
loans are usually given directly to clients, by other intermediaries. In
fact, this may be an important category of loans for the curb market, even
after an appropriate structure is created. Quickness of processing means that
either greater administrative/transaction costs must be incurred by the
institution, or greater risks must be taken. In either case, these type of
loans also require higher loan ceilings than those applicable to loans of
6-month - 1 year duration.
Table A4 gives the proportion of commercial bank loans of less than
1 year, 1 to 3 years, and over three year maturity. We make the arbitrary
assumption, that within these categories, the average maturity is 6 months,
- 13 -
2 years and 5 years respectively. Using this, the average maturity of the
commercial bank loan portfolio for 1982 is approximately 1.4 years and must
therefore lie between 1 and 2 years. Lending costs were approximately 2.1% of
loan amounts. Transaction costs for a 3-month or smaller duration loans could
easily by 50 to 150% greater than this. The premium for short duration loans
could therefore be between 1 and 3(X) points. A minimum differential of 1,
2 and 3 points for loans of 3, 2 and 1 month respectively would seem to be
quite reasonable. These illustrative calculations assume that the marginal
cost of funds is independent of the marginal allocation of loans, the usual
assumption in market analysis.
An overdraft facility is an instrument used by banks to lower the
transaction costs of emergency quick dispersing short term loans. It has the
limitation, however, that it is restricted to regular clients. This rate has
generally been set 2(%) points above the base/prime rate. This falls squarely
within the range given in the above section. In proportional terms 2 points
represented a spread of 13% above the base/prime rate of 15% in 1977-78
(Al). A ceiling which is higher by 15 to 20% on very short duration loans
seems quite reasonable.
Another differentiation which is ignored is by size of loan. There
are generally two parts to the administrative or transaction cost of making
loans. There is a cost which varies with loan amount. This includes the cost
of servicing deposits (2.11% in 1982) and part of the cost of processing
loans. There is also a proportion of loan cost which depends only on whether
a loan is made or not, i.e. some basic amount of paper work and loan appraisal
is necessary no matter how small the loan. If we assume that 1/10th of the
average cost of processing the loan (2.1%) is a fixed cost, then the average
cost of a loan (C) can be written
- 14 -
C = .04 - .00211 x Lav.
L
For a loan which is 1/5th to 1/10th the size of the average loan,
(Lavg.), transaction costs would be 1 to 2(X) points above those for the
average loan. For 1982, this is 8% to 16% above the average loan rate for the
year. These calculations are purely suggestive, and much more accurate
calculations could easily be made by banks and the government.
The Call Market
As Table 1 shows, the Call money market interest rates were most
highly correlated with the Curb market during the 1980, 1st quarter, to 1982,
2nd quarter, period. This would suggest, that perhaps this is a market, where
on the margin, both formal and informal markets were interacting. We find,
however, the same period correlation coefficient and the correlation between
the call rate and the lagged curb rate are both high at over .9. As in the
case of the general bill rate, the correlation between the curb rate and the
lagged call rate is significantly lower at .5. Thus, the call market rate was
more likely to be adjusting to the curb rate than vice versa.
Call market rate behavior during 1977, 3rd quarter, to 1979, 4th
quarter, was remarkably different however. There was virtually zero or
perhaps negative (-0.1) correlation with the curb rate. As noted earlier
this could be a sign that interest controls in the call market were pushing
borrowers into the curb market. The curb market has a potential role as a
bridge between different intermediaries. All such institutions should be
- 15 -
allowed to participate in it. It can also serve as a link to the informal
market, and provide a more accurate indicator of supply-demand condition. It
is therefore a prime candidate for complete liberalization. Any potential
harmful effects can be mitigated by having a Bank of Korea discount window for
general rediscounts which can put an effective ceiling on rates by supplying
all borrowers at that rate.
2.4 Deposit Rates
The average level of loan and deposit rates for the deposit money
banks will be a result of both the level and structure of rates. The spread
between the two rates plays a critical role in the issue of bank
profitability. The question of deposit rate levels is conventionally very
closely linked to the question of interest elasticity of savings. Information
constraints and lack of markets usually result in a large degree of
segmentation in the range of savings instruments available to different
groups. Free private intermediaries are likely to tacitly collude in using
this segmentation and setting rates so as to obtain deposits at minimum
costs. This has implications for equity between different groups which the
government may wish to change by setting deposit rates. Other longer term
objectives may also influence the social policy.
It is useful to distinguish at least three groups of private
depositors: Corporations, Household firms, and Household wage & salary
earners. Household firms may be divided into general business and moneylender
or curb dealers. Table 3 gives the money and deposit holdings of corporations
and households between 1975 and 1982, as a proportion of their total asset
portfolio. The money holdings to total asset ratio has been declining for
- 16 -
Table 3: Money and Savings Deposit Holdings to Total Assets
in Portfolio of Corporations and Individuals
1982 1981 1980 1978 1975
Private Corporation
Money 8.2 6.7 7.5 9.1 9.4
Deposits 11.2 11.5 18.5 22.1 22.1
Time & Savings 7.5 12.1 15.6 19.0 20.7
with ISCs 3.7 2.9 2.9 3.1 1.4
Individuals
Money 9.5 9.2 12.7 16.9 19.9
Deposits 43.4 42.0 41.7 40.9 39.3
Time & Savings 41.7 39.8 38.9 37.3 35.9
with ISCs 1.7 2.2 2.8 3.6 3.4
ISCO: Investment and Savings Companies
Source: Appendix Tables A6 and A7.
both entities, but shows a dramatic drop from 19.9% in 1975 to 9.5% in 1982
for households. In the case of corporations, the ratio declined steadily from
1975 to 1981 but rose in 1982.
Household checking deposits have had special higher rates of 6%
between 4-22-77 and 9-7-79, as against 1.8% for passbook and 1% for temporary
- 17 -
accounts. Similarly, from 7-1-1981 to 2-29-1982, the interest rate on
checking accounts was 14.4% (1.8% for others), and was subsequently reduced to
12% and then to 8% (6-28-82). This suggests that the changing portfolio
composition reflects a long term decline in relative money holdings of
households. If household firm behavior is anything like that of corporations
Free market demand deposit rates for this category would therefore
probably fall to zero. The government argument for giving higher rates
appears to be based on long term considerations of promoting the checking
habit. Though this can be a legitimate argument, household checking deposit
rates appear to be far out of line. Thus, the required minimum rate should be
dramatically reduced or eliminated. Alternatively, a rate differential could
be maintained through a government subsidy.
Table 3 shows a contrasting behavior of corporations and individuals
for the holding of deposits in their portfolio. Corporate holdings of
deposits have halved from 22.1% of total assets in 1975 to 11.2% in 1980.
Interestingly, this has been accompanied by a shift towards holding these
deposits with Investment & Savings institution. The overall decline probably
represents a shift to other new savings instruments, which have become
available. The shift to Investment and Savings institutions is related to
this but is also associated with the increase in loan and intermediation
business that they performed for the corporations. The fluctuation in the
ratio also represents a degree of responsiveness of the portfolio to interest
rate changes.
Individual portfolio holdings of deposits show a slow and steady
uptrend, with a shift within deposits away from investment institutions. If
household firms' behavior is intermediate between that of corporations and
- 18 -
salary earners, then the trends must be even more dramatic for these
individuals. Though concrete evidence is lacking, I would hypothesize that
this category of individuals has much less information about alternative
instruments and economic conditions, and is therefore less responsive to
interest rate changes. Individual businesses probably fall in between them
and corporations. Money lenders are probably most responsive in their
portfolio composition to interest changes.
Free market deposit setting would therefore probably result in fairly
low rates where concentration of salaried depositors (value) is high and
higher rates where those of corporations are high. Equity consideration
therefore have a role in deposit rate setting. Efficiency considerations
suggest that deposit rates should be positively related to maturity and
size. Some compromise between private rate setting and equity and efficiency
may be necessary.
2.5 Interest Rate Levels and Bank Profitability
One of the hazards of controlling bank interest rates is the effect
that mistakes in rate setting can have on the profitability and health of the
banking system. This is well illustrated by the changes in interest rate
policy during 1982 and 1983. As previously noted the unification and
reduction in loan rates to 10% was accompanied by a reduction of deposit rates
to 8%. The simultaneous reduction in deposit rates was of course designed to
maintain the nominal spreads between borrowing and lending rates. The
reduction in Bank of Korea discount rates on loans and discounts to 5.0% was
also designed to maintain the profitability position of intermediaries. For
commercial banks this was supplemented by widening the permitted range of bank
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business to include profitable activities like sale of commercial bills and of
public bonds under repurchase. These measures were not however sufficient in
reversing the decline in effective spread resulting from the overhang of
longer term deposits at higher rates. Rough estimates suggest that the profit
margin between deposits and loans may have fallen from about 1.2% in 1981 to
0.8% in 1982. This was followed, however, in 1983 by a reduction of Bank of
Korea rediscount ratio's on most loan categories. As shown in Table A5 the
automatic discount proportion for defense and fishery loans was reduced by 10
percentage points and Energy Loans by 20 percentage points in February.
Rediscount proportions on export loans were subsequently (June) adjusted by 10
percentage points. One purpose of this action was to reduce subsidies to
these categories of borrowers 6/. This, however, put renewed pressure on bank
profitability, despite the subsequent increase in the interest rates paid on
required reserves (effective retroactively) and the various fees banks are
permitted to charge (e.g. on Bond guarantees). By rough estimate the
effective spread between deposits and loans is likely to have declined to 0.2%
in 1983 (from 0.8%). There is no doubt that either a downward adjustment in
deposit rates or an upward adjustment in loan discount rates was absolutely
essential.
Within the principles outlined earlier, both deposit and loan rates
should be set through genuine consultation between intermediaries and the
government. To summarize, the level of the base rates must be set keeping in
account the supply-demand conditions and bank profitability, and should be
responsive to changing conditions. The rate structure must be differentiated
across categories and types, but must be the same across institutions if the
category/type is identical, to avoid destabilizing capital movements across
institutions (considered more fully below).
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Section 3. The Financial System: Intermediaries and Instruments
In the development of the financial system, the role of different
intermediaries is often interlinked with the role of different financial
instruments. It is useful, however, to look first at the former. Figure 3
gives the time pattern of change in the proportion of assets of different
financial intermediaries. The overall picture is one of the decline in the
role of the deposit money banks relative to other institution since 1975.
3.1. The Specialized Banks and Development Institutions
If one compares the period before 1975 to that after it, there appears
to have been a fairly sharp decline in the role of special banks. Their
assets declined from a ratio of 34% in 1972-74 to about 27% since then (Table
A8). A slightly different perspective suggests a relative decline during the
period 1972 to 1976, from 35% to 25% and a stabilization at around 27% since
then. Analysis suggests that such institutions can play a useful,-role in
developing new markets, where information and other constraints keep existing
intermediaries from making loans. This is because they ae implicitly or
explicitly subsidized by governments to encourage development of new markets,
where they dobnot exist before. That is historicafly they have tended to be
incentive based rather than forced lending instruments in most countries
including Korea.
The stabilization of their assets suggests that at last for the older
institution, such a push has been virtually exhausted. To the extent that an
inappropriate structure of interest rates has held back their development,
suggested reforms will have a positive effect. An additional possibility for
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these established institutions, would be to allow diversification of their
activities. A gradual lifting of restrictions to allow activities formerly
reserved for other institutions would allow them to use their special
information in new areas. Incentive systems for directing loans in desired
directions would then be applicable across institutions. 71
Though the share of development institutions in total financial assets
shows a weak rising trend, the above analysis applies with equal force to
these institutions. This is particularly true for the Korea Development Bank
and the Korean Long Term Credit bank. Necessary reform of the maturity
structure will have a positive effect on these institutions. Serious
consideration should be given to lifting restrictions on their lending and
deposit activities.
3.2 Commercial Banks
The share of assets of the commercial banks have declined
progressively from 49% in 1975 to 37% in 1982. This is a period marked by
considerable ferment in financial markets. The primary reason for the decline
is much more mundane. That is, a relative decline in their primary activity --
loans Figure 4, and Table A9 (2nd row), show that the proportion of loans
supplied by deposit money banks declined from 55.6% in 1975 to 43.8% in
1982. This, of course, contains the loans by special banks. As the
specialized bank's assets have hovered around 26-27% during this period, it is
reasonable to assume that most of this decline is for the commercial banks.
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Table 4: Simple Average Interest Rate Ratios
1 2 3 4
Prime Loan Prime Loan 1 Year TD 1 Year TD
Curb Rate SIFC Discount Curb Rate SIFC Deposit
(60-90 day)
1977 .42 .76 1/ .415 .81
1978 .40 .81 .42 .86
1979 .435 .82 .44 .85
1980 .52 .87 .51 .86
1981 .55 .87 .55 .88
1982 .40 .83 .35 .80
1983 .48 .83 .38 .75
1/ Average over 3rd and 4th quarter only.
Source: Table A2
A prime (conventional) culprit in bringing about this result would be
interest rate controls. Table 4 gives a summary of interest rate ratios which
may be used as a proxy for the degree of interest constraint or the supply-
demand imbalance in the bank loan market: High ratios denote little
constraint and vice versa. At least, for the period 1977-1982, these do not
provide an explanation for the decline. The fairly high ratio's in 1980 and
1981 do not seem to have had any effect on the declining trend between 1979
and 1982. The explanation lies in the distinction drawn earlier between the
level and structure of interest rates. Table 4 measures only the former while
the real problem stems from the latter.
To obtain the full picture we have to look at another aspect of bank
business, that of bond guarantees. These guarantees represent a commitment to
repay to bond holders 100% of the value of the bond in case of default. From
the banks' perspective, these bonds are almost identical to a loan backed by a
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fixed deposit of equal amount and term. A minor difference is that it does
not have to incur the cost of servicing the deposit and collects the spread
directly from the issuing company as a guarantee fee. In principle, a bond is
also tradeable in a secondary market though this activity has not been
significant so far (analyzed later). But by the same token loans can be taken
on the surety of a fixed deposit at a small premium.. In the Korean context,
these bonds have been virtually identical to loans, though their profitability
to banks may have differed.
Table 12 shows the ratio of bond guarantees given by commercial banks
to their loans from banking funds. Bond guarantees as a share of these two
activities grew rapidly from 1.2% in 1975 to 14.6% in 1980. In the next two
years this ratio stabilized at approximately 14%, and then grew again in
1983. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 4 show that relative interest constraints on
loans (and TDs) were reduced sharply in 1980 and maintained at those levels in
1981. This position was reversed again in 1983. This suggests that loan
ceilings may have had a greater (somewhat lagged) effect on this aspect of
bank business. The bond guarantee business seems to be negatively affected by
the relative level of interest rate in the bank loan market. Table All shows
that of total debentures outstanding in 1982, 75% were the liabilities of
private corporations and 25% that of government corporations. Most of the
guaranteed bond issues are by the largest and strongest private
corporations. Earlier analysis (authors 1982/1984) has already suggested that
given an inappropriate structure of interest rates, tight ceilings affect the
weakest (low returns and/or high risk) borrowers first and the strong ones
last. If there were no other lending constraints, banks would shift their
portfolio towards the large corporations when these constraints are more
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binding and away from them when less binding. Therefore, we expect guaranteed
bond activity to be positively affected in the later case, as has been
observed in the recent period.
The overall decline in bank loan business is, in this environment,
much more strongly affected by the structure of interest rates. The incorrect
structure has led at least at this broad level (though detailed data is not
available for confirmation) to a steady decline in the proportion of loans
that banks make to the relatively weaker firms. Despite the increase in this
indirect form of lending through loan guarantees, the loan proportion of banks
adjusted for bond guaranteesrshows a smaller but definite declining trend.
The decline is from 55.8% in 1975 to 46.1% in 1982 instead of from 55.6% to
43.8% for loans alone (based on data frp, A9 and A12).
Liberalization
Pressures arising directly or indirectly from the balance of payments
position had led in 1981 to a resurrection of the policy of denationalization,
with Hanil Bank returning to private hands. Two more banks were
denationalized in 1982 and another in early 1983. These were supplemented by
liberalized entry rules, with two new banks being allowed to open business
over the same period. The entry of new banks raised the aggregate capital
assets of the banking system, and can, over the long run, provide beneficial
competition. In the prevailing situation it was probably another factor in
worsening bank profitability. Similarly, though denationalization could in
principle encourage a shift towards the use of profitability criteria in
lending decisions, it takes time to professionalize management and reorient
internal and external monitoring and control mechanism. It is not sufficient
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just to declare formal managerial autonomy in budgeting, personnel management
and organizational decisions (Dec. 1982). Given the declining profitability
and the growing volume of "non-performing" (non-repayed) loans
denationalization also reduces the perceived stability of the banking system,
by eliminating the government's formal backing.
3.3 Trade Credit
An important counterpart of the decline in the relative proportion of
bank loans is the increase in the relative importance of trade credit. As
shown in Table A9, trade credits as a proportion of total loans (& credit)
increased from about 15% in 1975 (14% in 1974) to about 21% in 1982. Though
it fluctuates strongly in some years, the general trend has been upward. Even
more important has been the structure of trade credit itself. The proportion
of total trade credit given by private corporations increased from 82% in 1975
to over 90% by 1982. This has been accompanied by an even sharper fall in the
proportion of trade credit going to these corporations. This fell from 72% of
total trade credit in 1975 to 42% in 1982 (see All for recent data). Thus,
there has been a substantial. growth1 in the net trade credit given by private
corporations.
An examination of the corporate sectors' asset portfolio confirms this
conclusion (Table A6). Though trade credit taken as a proportion of total
liabilities fluctuated considerably, it shows no clear trends. Trade credit
outstanding as a proportion of total assets virtually doubled from 21% in 1975
to 40% in 1982. As a counterpart to this, the asset portfolio of households
(including firms) shows a clear inverse trend. Trade credits as a proportion
of total liabilities increased from 2% in 1975 to 17% in 1982. This issue is
. _ _~
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related somewhat to the issue of bank loan portfolio shifts and guaranteed
bonds analyzed earlier. It is also an example of the broader issues of the
existence and efficiency of capital markets.
3.4 Diversified Corporations as Allocators of Capital
The previous analysis suggests that large private corporations in
Korea have increasing-l-y-t-aken on the role of financial intermediation for
smaller less diversified household firms. As suggested earlier, this is
partly due to the incorrect structure of interest controls. It also
illustrates, however, the capital market inefficiencies resulting from
information constraints. As most of these smaller firms have no direct access
to security and bond markets, the only capital market relevant to them are the
various loan and credit markets. The important role of different information
between potential lenders in loan markets, has been anlaysed elsewhere 8/.
Corporations, of course, have unique and extensive knowledge about the
behavior and characteristics of their suppliers, and to a lesser extent, their
buyers. More importantly, the large corporations because of the extent of
their diversification can pool returns and reduce risk, a function which
equity markets, perform in developed countries. They can, therefore, provide
a partial substitute for these markets, by directing their own and input
suppliers capital, as well as borrowed funds, to their most efficient use.
Though the short term effects appear to be quite clearly positive, there are
some pitfalls. The major one is that suppliers would tend to get locked into
individual corporations. Paradoxically, this phenomena seems analogous to the
problem of interlinkage between loan and output markets or share-tenancy in
some LDC agricultural markets. Lack of alternative loan sources can therefore
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reduce the flexibility and responsiveness of the suppliers and reduce
~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~- --- - --- - -- - -- 
competitiveness in these markets. The case for providing either positive or
negative incentives to intermediaries to encourage or discourage such behavior
by corporations is not however, strong.
Short Term Investment and Finance Companies (SIFCs)
Both insurance companies and savings institutions have slowly but
gradually increased their intermediation role as_shown_by-th-ierrelative
assets (Table A8). The most dramatic increase has however been in the role
played by SIFCs. The share of their assets in the assets of financial
intermediaries increased from 4.3% in 1975 to 10.7% in 1982. A popular
explanation of the relative growth of the SIFCs is that in the absence of
formal ceilings on their loan and deposit rates they have been able to offer
higher deposit rates and to do more aggressive marketing of loans.
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 (p.23) give the ratio of the bank bill rate
to the SIFC discount rate and the one year deposit rate to the SIFC deposit
rate. These confirm that over the period 1977 to 1983 the SIFC loan and
deposit rates have been significantly higher than that of deposit money
banks. Table A9 shows however that the ratio of SIFC loans to total loans and
credits was almost the same in 1982 as it was in 1975 (3.2 to 3.3%). Though
it grew marginally to 4.2% in 1978, it has declined since then. Though the
loan interest gap narrowed in 1980 and 1981 (Table 4) there is no noticeable
impact of this on loan shares from 1980 to 1982 (Table A9).
The SIFCs were set up after the curb loan freeze of 1972 to provide an
alternative channel to the underground curb market. For the long term it was
hoped that SIFCs would compete with short term informal markets for depositors
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and business borrowers. An important part of their business is the issuance
of their own paper which are effectively like deposits. As previously
suggested if any interest ceilings are to be applied they must be based on
deposit characteristics and not on institutions. There is a minor
qualification arising from the fact that banks may be much more safe from
depositors' perspective than the SIFCs. There are two ways of dealing with
this problem. One is to have a National Deposit insurance scheme which
insures deposits, but charges a higher insurance fee from SIFCs. An
alternative is to allow SIFCs to give marginally higher deposit interest rates
on deposits of comparable maturity and size.
The other important segment of their business and the major reason for
their fast growth, is dealing in paper issued by business firms. This has two
components: The placing of Industrial (and commercial) paper issued by firms,
and the rediscounting of promissory notes and bills. Most of this business
relates to bills issued by large companies. Table A13 shows the rapid rise in
the growth of Industrial papers between 1975 and 1982. The ratio of
Industrial Papers outstanding to loans and credits has grown from 1.4% in 1975
to 4.7% in 1981 and stabilised thereafter. An indication that the SIFCs have
reaped a major part of the benefit of the growth of this new instrument is
given in Table A14. The growth of bills resold by SIFCs kept pace with the
growth in industrial papers. Between 1975 and 1982, the compound yearly
growth rate for the former was 63.7%, and for the latter 63.8%.
The importance of Resold Bills in the business of SIFCs is also shown
in Table A14 by the ratio of Resold Bills to Assets and Liabilities. This
grew from .33 in 1975 to 1.23 in 1981 and has since declined to 1.05 at the
end of the third quarter of 1983. This is partly due to the leveling off in
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the relative growth of industrial papers. A change in regulations has also
permitted the sale of commercial bills by banks since September 1982. Another
reason is the change in government regulations which permitted entry of 10 new
SIFCs between July 1982 and March 1983. The assets of the SIFCs have
therefore increased due to new capitalization. The result of all this will be
intense competitive pressure even on the established SIFCs.
Banks Entry into the Commercial Paper Market
The freedom for banks to expand into the short term paper market is a
positive development for two reasons. Firstly, as suggested earlier, direct
short term loans may have very high transaction costs, so that discounting of
industrial and commercial paper may be a more efficient way of making short
term loans. Secondly, the banks will have the opportunity of using their base
of information and knowledge about their current clients in new directions.
They are thus likely to take over on increasing share of the corporate
business. The changing nature of the distribution of industrial paper
suggests that this may be a substantial portion of base steady state issue of
such paper. As shown in Table A13 almost 100% of the paper was issued by
private corporations in 1982 and 1981. In 1981, however, 60% of this paper
was held by individuals and 36% by corporations. This shifted significantly
in 1982 to 49% by individuals and 45% by corporations.
The SIFCs will be forced by this competition into moving into new
directions or folding. Some of them are likely to get even more closely
linked to individual business groups and serve as a conduit for short term
funds to them and their associated non-corporate suppliers and customers. The
alternative is to compete much more directly with the curb market by
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increasing their flexibility and responsiveness. Their ability to do this
will depend critically on the interest rate differentials that are allowed on
this type of higher risk, quick disbursing, high transaction cost lending
activity.
Section 4. Securities Markets: Debentures and Equities
The relative importance of the loan, securities and industrial paper
markets can be seen from Figure 5. Taking a simple average for 1981 and 1982
(from Table A9), we find that they constitute approximately 70%, 26% and 4% of
the financial assets and liabilities respectively. Comparison of the
distribution for 1975 and 1982 shows that the relative importance of the
securities markets has increased only marginally by about .5%. One might
suspect that this is due to a shift away from government bonds to private
bonds and stocks. On the contrary the latter as a proportion of total
securities actually declined from 80% in 1975 to 61% in 1982.
Table All gives the distribution of holdings of total securities, and
of specific securities by type of holder. For total securities, the holder
category Other Financial Institutions (OFIs) have increased their proportion
of both the holdings and issue of securities. The holdings going from 14% of
total in 1975 to 23% in 1982 and issues going from 7% in 1975 to 19% of total
in 1982. The distribution of holdings of (private) debentures suggests, that
much of this increase was in holding of debenture.- Between 1975 and 1982 OFIs
almost doubled their holdings from 29% to 57% of total outstandings. Much of
these holdings are concentrated in the investment institutions including the
SIFCs. Thus these financial intermediaries have progressively increased their
intermediary role in the securities markets. As the previous analysis of
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relative asset growth showed (Table A8) the OFIs grew relatively faster than
other intermediaries and their role in the securities market is an important
reason for it.
The proportion of securities held by Individuals has declined from 52%
in 1975 to 45% in 1982 (Table All). A look at individual portfolio holdings
(Table A7) shows that securities as a proportion of their portfolio have shown
a marginal increase from 29% to 30% during the same period. More significant
has been the shift away from stocks to debentures and beneficiary
certificates. Between 1975 and 1982 stock holdings declined from 25% to 18%
of the portfolio while debentures and beneficiary certificates increased from
1% to 3% and nil to 8% respectively. The previous analysis of OFI
intermediation suggests that much of the beneficiary certificates represent
holdings of debentures and to a lesser extent government bonds or financial
debentures. The holdings of stocks versus the direct and indirect holding of
other securities is almost equal in 1982.
Two conclusions follow from this: Firstly, that financial
institutions will continue to play an increasing role in making various type
of bonds available to small individual holders. Secondly, that there is a
need for an institution providing a mutual fund of securities, through which
individuals of small or medium wealth can pool the risk of holding such
securities.
4.1 Bond Markets
The most significant development in the Bond market over the past
decade has been the growth of primary corporate bond_market. Compared to a
rate of growth of 42% in total bonds outstanding , corporate bonds outstanding
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grew at a compound annual rate of 77% from 1975 to 1982 (Table A15). They
therefore increased their share of the bond market from 50% in 1975 to 85% in
1982. Of even greater significance is the fact that most of this growth was
in guaranteed bonds. These grew at a compound annual rate of 89% increasing
their share from 62% in 1975 to 97% in 1982 (Table A15). The primary
corporate bond market is therefore virtually identical to the market for
guaranteed bonds. It operates primarily through the stock exchange, with
almost 98% of outstanding bonds listed on the stock exchange in 1982.
Financial Innovation
The growth of guaranteed bonds therefore represents a major innovation
in the Korean financial market. It was shown earlier that these bonds are
virtually like loans as far as banks are concerned. In fact because banks do
not take any collateral for making such an "implicit loan" they are much more
risky for the banks. Thus they tend to transfer risk from equity to bond
holders, but in this case to the bank which guarantees them 9/. The only case
in which the banks will be willing to take such risk is if they have
information about, and some influence on the issuing firms, through the
mechanism of their regular loans to these firms. Much of these guarantees
have been by deposit money banks; their share between 77% and 92%, with a
simple average of 83% over the 1975 to 1980 period.
It is therefore instructive to analyse the reasons for this
innovation. It has been shown how lack of information and incorrect judgement
can result in non-lending to certain categories of borrowers or of certain
types of loans 10/. It was also shown how private returns to individual
institutions might be lower than the social returns because as soon as the
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activity was demonstrated to be profitable, such profits would tend to get
competed away 11/. Restrictions imposed in certain markets as they were in
the bank loan market in Korea, can change the private incentives and
perceptions about other markets. This is, I believe, what happened in the
guaranteed bond market.. A relative lack of incentives/opportunities of direct
lending made it profitable for banks to adopt this more risky form of lending.
As guaranteed bonds are equivalent to deposit-loan combinations of
equal maturity and issuer/borrower type, applicable interest rates must be
similar. If we assume that depositers are indifferent on margin between bank
deposits and guaranteed bonds, we can equate the risk adjusted returns (as a
crude approximation). These bonds are somewhat riskier for banks but involve
somewhat lower administrative costs (r-i-t). They may also be perceived as
somewhat riskier than deposits by bond holders. If we assume that depositors
are indifferent on margin between making a bank deposit or buying a guaranteed
bond, we can equate the risk adjusted returns (as a crude approximation).
Then the real unit cost of funds to the firm R is then given by the sum of
payments to final holders and intermediates, i.e.,
R = (l+a) i + d + (r-i-t) + p
where the decrease in bank's administrative cost is t , the broker takes a
commission d , i is the deposit interest rate, a the proportional premium
required by bond holders, r is the interest rate on loans and p the or
risk premium required by the bank.
It is useful to start with a look at the bond holder's yields. In the
above equation this is given by (l+a)i. Table A16 shows that the yield on
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corporate bonds was 16.8% in 1982 while the average deposit interest rate on
1-3 year deposits was 11% (Table Al). From this, it is easily seen that
a = 0.527. Government also set ceilings on rates payable on 3 year bonds at
11% + 1.5% (=.1364xll) for the first year, and 1.3 times the time deposit (TD)
rate for the next two years. We can make an alternative calculation by a
using these rates to
obtain a = 0.1364 + .3 + = 0.525 . This suggests that
1.168 (1.168)2 (1.168)3
bond holders correctly calculated the effective yield on bonds. It is
impossible to believe, however, that a risk premium of 53% is required to
induce depositors to hold corporate bonds guaranteed by banks when perfectly
riskless government. Even more paradoxically, public bonds have even higher
yields (as high as 17.7 in 1982; Table A16). It confirms therefore the
previously mentioned hypothesis of segmented deposit markets.
Using the formula given above, we can calculate the cost of funds to
the issuer of bonds for 1982. We assume that the maximum discounting allowed
by the government (4%) was the actual discount, and covered both brokerage
fees and bank transaction costs. If we also assume that the risk premium of
the bank is equal to the guarantee fee (1%) we find that the cost of funds
R was 21.8%. If, alternatively, the entire discount was passed on to bond
holders the cost of funds would be 17.8% (16.8 + 1%). Even taking this lower
estimate suggests that these firms paid a premium of 5% points for bond
financing. According to conventional treatment, this would represent the
element of effective interest ceiling and rationing in the market. The firms
do not, however, give any collateral to obtain this finance. It can be shown
that if collateral is constrained below its effective value, the interest rate
will be much higher than it would have been without the constraints. It was
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also shown earlier that firms effectively transfer all risk to the banks. For
both these reasons firms may be willing to pay a 37% premium on the
collateralized loan rate.
Implicit in the lower bound calculation is a zero return to bank
capital from making loans. We have already shown that the average return on
loans in 1982 was negative. Bank's had at least a 1% return on guarantees
through the guarantee fee. If all the returns from discounting bonds was not
passed on to the bond holders intermediates would receive an extra return of
between 0 and 4%. This would provide an incentive to shift good borrowers
from loans to bond guarantees. Incentives may have been even stronger in the
preceeding years. Within the limitations of available data, this provides
indirect evidence for the innovation hypothesis presented above. It also
supports the bank portfolio shifts analysed earlier in Sections 3.2. Now that
much of the innovation has taken place in this particular area, banks should
be allowed to charge much higher guarantee fees than the current 1.5%.
Policy Measures
There is a more fundamental incentive problem with 100% guaranteed
bonds, which needs to be addressed directly. They provide an incentive for
engaging in "excessively" risky activities. Their zero collateral nature
coupled with the 100% guarantee effectively makes banks into nonvoting equity
holders. They cannot directly dissuade firms from undertaking risky
activities which may result in nonrepayment of bonds and a consequent loss to
banks. For the development of a genuine primary corporate bond market,
greater encouragement needs to be given to urguaranteed4boiis. Issue of such
bonds by ligsted-compahies should therefore be freed from all control
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regulations including any form of interest ceilings. The need to protect
bondholders suggests, however, that firms must be required to publicize their
true debt and financial position whenever they issue such bonds. This will
allow potential bondholders to assess the value of holding such bonds.
Another possible measure to develop the market would be to introduce
guaranteed bonds which carry a lower than 100% guarantee. For example
government might encourage the development of bonds carrying a guarantee of
say 90%, by setting significantly higher interest ceilings. This may be
accompanied by tax incentives for holders.
4.2 Secondary Market in Bonds
A superficial look at the bond market gives a misleading picture of
the secondary markets. For example, Table A17 suggests that 6,247 billion Won
of bonds were traded on this market in 1982 which is almost three times the
amount of corporate bonds issued in that year. A more accurate picture
requires an understanding of the markets as presented in tables A18 and A19.
The entire secondary market consists of sales and purchase of bonds under
repurchase agreements, and not of outright sale as is typical in developed
country markets. The nature of this transaction is therefore basically like a
loan against the collateral of bonds. A simplistic analysis of Tables A18 and
A19 suggests that the period of "loan", or the period between the initial or
reverse repurchase transaction and its inverse was approximately one month in
the 1977 to 1980 period and varying between 1 and 3 months in later periods.
Similarly, the period of the "loan" repo transactions was about 4 months in
1982 and 1983, and varying between 2 and 6 months. In other words, these were
fairly short term "loans".
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The statistics in Table Al8 are gathered largely from brokerage houses
and other security related companies. As these constituted most of the
institutional trades in the early stages this table gives a fairly accurate
picture. For 1982 and 1983 a complete picture is available from Tables A19
and A20. The other data problem relates to the fact that the sale of bonds
under repurchase agreements for one side of the market should be equivalent to
the purchase of a bond under reverse-repurchase. The data in these two tables
suggests that only one side of the market is being caught even though some of
the transactions may have been caught from both sides. We will ignore the
latter possibility.
After initial growth between 1977 and 1978 the market seems to have
fluctuated till 1980. Thus the ratio of Repos Outstanding to listed Bonds
outstanding was 0.7% in 1977, 6.0% in 1978 and about 2% in 1979 and 1980
(Table A18 column 11). The market grew rapidly thereafter; the rate of growth
of total outstandings was 175% between November 1981 and December 1982, and
lower, but still fairly high, at 64% between September 1982 and September
1983. (Bottom of Table A19). Thus Repos Outstanding as a proportion of total
bonds outstanding grew from 7.5% at the end of 1981 to 15.4% at the end of
1982 and to 19.9% at the end of the third quarter of 1983.
Table A20 gives an idea of the operators in this market, or the net
borrowers and lenders in this short term loan market. Individuals appear to
be the most important borrowers in the market, followed by corporations. If
we assume that the amount of loan is proportional to the value of the bonds
which acts as collateral we can calculate the proportion. Their borrowing
constituted about 70% of the total at 1982 and, 66% at end of October 1983.
Corporate borrowers have increased sharply, however from 21% to 31% over the
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same period. This is probably a reflection of the loan market constraints
analysed earlier. Listed companies were the major lenders in 1982, but
withdrew from the market in 1983 reflecting the same credit conditions.
The fact that there is discrepancy of 500 billion Won between
borrowing and lending at 1982 end 1975 billion Won by October 1983, suggests
that most of the lenders were not identified. I would hypothesize that most
of this discrepancy represented informal or curb market loans. The sharp
increase in this discrepancy would then represent a shift of curb lenders out
of this traditional channels (e.g., against promissory notes and bills) to new
methods.
The growth of this market does represent a widening and diversifying
of the loan market and is therefore a positive development. The permission
given to commercial banks in August 1982 to handle sales of government and
public bonds under repurchase agreements is therefore also a positive
development. It does not however represent, at this stage, a secondary market
in the traditional sense. Any view which sees, this as a widening of the
broader capital market (securities market), must therefore be viewed with
caution.
4.3 The Stock Market
As graphed in Figure 5 and shown in Table A9 all securities as a
proportion of total assets increased only marginally from 26.1% in 1975 to
26.8% in 1982. Stocks as a proportion of total securities fell drastically
from 76.5% to 38.9%. As the composite stock price index in 1982 was 127.3
compared 89.7 in 1975 this fall in proportion reflects a relative decline in
the importance of the stock market. This also reflected in the portfolio
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composition of private corporations. Stocks as a proportion of total
liabilities declined from 34% in 1975 to 24% in 1982 and 16% in 1982 (Table
A6).
The proportion of stocks issued and held by corporations both show a
U shaped pattern between 1975 and 1982. The former was 75% and 77% at the
two end points while the latter was 17% at both points. The proportion of
stocks held by individuals also shows similar patterns, but increased from 58%
in 1975 to 63% in 1982. The importance of stocks in the individual portfolio
declined however from 25% of total assets in 1975 to 16% in 1982.
There is a question about the nature of equity markets in developing
countries which is worth investigating in the Korean context. It is my
hypothesis that in the early stages of development of the stock market, these
markets are qualitatively different from those in developed countries. The
smallness and its thinness for particular equities or subgroups of equities
makes the quantity to be bought or sold as important as the price (cannot be
treated parametrically). The time period or quickness with which a sale is
made may also significantly affect the price. Equity holding cannot therefore
be used as a reserve asset to supplement missing consumption loan markets, in
evening out the flow of consumption. Control over the financial decisions of
firms therefore becomes a critical factor. This appears in the large number
of firms in which an individual' family or group of friends hold majority
shares to ensure financial control. This in turn can make equities less
attractive to minority or noncontrolling shareholders.
In the Korean context the previously mentioned existence of large
diversified conglomerates can complicate this simple picture. Such firms have
an alternative channel for smoothing consumption. Relative to almost all
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other potential borrowers, they have virtually unlimited access to loan
markets. Thus they can easily shift funds between use of loan for business
purposes and use for consumption (or dividend payments). We would therefore
expect a genuine equity market to emerge first for these type of firms.
Table A21 gives two different estimates of the secondary market
activity in the Korean stock exchange. Column I shows the number of existing
stocks traded as a proportion of the average number of listed stock. This has
fluctuated between .03% and .07% with the latter proportion prevailing-'in both
1969 and 1981. Though this is consistent with the hypothesis presented above,
the facts are more complicated. Column E shows the value of trade in existing
shares as a proportion of the average market value (beginning to end of
period) of outstanding stocks. This shows a completely different picture,
with the ratio fluctuating between 29% and 81% over the same period.
The explanation lies in the proviso given in the previous
paragraph. For 1982 we find that the shares of 40 large companies were
responsible for about 71% of the total value of sales. These companies
represent 12% of all the companies listed on the stock exchange in 1982. The
large discrepancy between the two measures provided earlier probably arises
because most of the secondary activity is in a small number of very highly
priced stock. This would make the value measure much higher than the volume
measure. It also suggests that a genuine equity market may be emerging for a
small number of large diversified firms.
Rates of Return
An examination of Table A22 shows that the average rate of return on
equity for the period 1976 to 1982 was 22.8% while that of corporate bonds was
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20.9%. On the other hand, the variance in stock yields was 67.4% as against
21.7% for bonds. A rate of return premium of 1l.9% seems totally inadequate to
compensate for the much higher variance. This again seems to confirm the
hypothesis presented earlier. A word of caution is, however in order. The
difference in returns between the two types of securities was significantly
positive during the 1976-78 period, but became significantly negative over
1979 to 1982 period. This may be partly due to the major shock to the system
following from the oil shock (analysed later). This should not, however
affect the relative returns for more than one or at most two years. The fact
that stock market return continued to be lower than bond yields in 1981 and
1982 reduces the effect of this cautionary note.
Tables A23 and A24 give the pattern of share holding over 1981 and
1982. Three related facts emerge for this period: (1) a decline in the total
number of shareholders; (2) a decline in proportion of shares held by
individuals; and (3) an increasing concentration of the proportion of shares
held by those over 100,000 shares. These facts suggest that small individual
shareholder, the ones most likely to constitute "minority" shareholdings are
leaving the market. This is consistent with the lower returns mentioned
earlier.
In Korea the bogus name system combined with minority share holding
requirements for listing, have probably resulted in a large number of
apparently minority shareholders who are really part of the majority group.
Thus the possible introduction of the real name system may push these out of
the market. The introduction of this system may therefore require some
loosening of the minority holdings requirements if a fall in the number of
listed companies is to be prevented. The increase in the proportion of shares
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held by security companies and insurance companies and other corporations may
represent a converse of this phenomenon (Table A24). Majority groups may have
worked out mutual arrangements through the aegis of the securities companies
or directly, to become minority holders. This is possible because many of the
companies listed in the stock market also have holdings in security, insurance
investment and savings institutions.
The development of equity markets can be seen from two related but
slightly different perspectives, the width and depth of the market. The
former is usually viewed in terms of the number of listed companies, or the
proportion of total investment capital raised in the equity market. This
results in policies to encourage (incentives) or force (outside discentives)
to firms to list their stock on the capital market. Examples of such policies
would be a reduction in minority holding requirements and higher tax rates for
nonpublic firms.
More important, in my view, is the deepening of the market in terms of
secondary trading. According to the hypothesis presented previously, the
investor's perspective and his ability to sell and buy any given amount in a
reasonable time, is critical to his holding of equities. In the light of
evidence presented earlier the opportunities for secondary trading in shares
of large companies is very important, and will play a major role in the future
development of the market. It is therefore important to encourage expansion
of this market.
Public and semipublic institutions (e.g. a Social Security Fund) are
most likely to be "expected profit" rather than "expected-utility"
maximizers. Encouragement should therefore be provided for such institutions
to participate in the holding and trading of equities. A gradual easing of
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restrictions on financial intermediaries to allow holding of and trading in
equities could be considered, though this must be traded off with the
possibility of greater industrial concentration. Wealthy individuals should
be encouraged to hold equities in firms which they do not control by providing
differential tax treatment. Restrictions on loans for equity buying should
also be eased.
4.4 Accelerated Depreciation and Debt-Equity Ratios
Many observers have noted the apparently high debt-equity (net-worth)
ratios in Korea and some have attributed-it to availability of "subsidized"
credit. It is, of course, well known that inflation can change the real value
of both these terms. In the Korean context the accelerated depreciation
provided, is I believe a more important factor, as observers have typically
used the book value of capital in their net-worth measures. An examination of
the income tax law shows special depreciation provisions giving an
acceleration in depreciation of. between 40% and 80%. Using a simple algebraic
model we can derive the following relationship between the steady state values
of the book value of capital (KB) to the real capital stock (K): 13/
KB (1-6 a)g
K g+68- 6
where g is the rate of gross investment to real capital, 6 is the real
depreciation rate, 6B is the allowable depreciation rate, and B is the
proportion of investment which is allowed to be depreciated within the year of
investment itself.
The above formula shows that the ratio of book value to real capital
is positively related to the gross investment ratio and negatively related to
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the allowed depreciation. Accelerated depreciation therefore leads to an
understatement of capital and consequently an overstatement of the rate of
return to capital. Tables A25 and A26 give an idea of the orders of magnitude
involved. The case in which the real depreciation rate is 8% and allowable
depreciation rate is 12%, or 50% accelerated depreciation, is shown below:
Table 5: Book Value of Capital to Real Capital Stock (Z)
Investment to
Real Capital (g) 10 15 20 30
Investment to
Book Capital (gB) 16 22 27 36
Book to Real
Capital 62 69 73 83
Even with a fairly high investment ratio of 30% real or 36% book value, book
value of capital is only 83% of real value. Thus even in a period of high and
steady growth with only 50% accelerated depreciation, the debt/equity ratio
could be overstated by 20%. With 100% accelerated depreciation the
overstatement would be as much as 50%. In the manufacturing sector the
investment to book value ratio was approximately 26%, 17% and 21% in 1981,
1982 and 1983 respectively. Over such a period the steady state ratio of book
value to real capital would change from 0.73 to 0.69 to.0.62 for the case
depicted above. This fluctuation is much less than the fluctuation in the
investment ratio. For a given level of acceleration in depreciation (say 40%)
the fluctuation increases however with the level of real depreciation.
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Section 5. Forced Lending Policy and the Banking System
There are two fundamental issues which arise when the banking system
is used by the government to allocate capital. One is the desirability of
increasing (decreasing) the flow of resources to the particular sub-sectors or
uses. The case for such intervention must be based either on grounds of market
failure or of a discrepancy between social and private returns. As I have
shown elsewhere, the discrepancy between the expected marginal returns to
loans and the cost of funds to the banking system can be used as an indicator
of market failure. The other is the instruments to be used to affect
reallocation. These can be classified broadly into incentive mechanisms and
forced lending. The former includes subsidized rediscounting by the central
bank and subsidized credit (collateral) guarantee funds. The latter is often
combined with interest rate ceilings, as it has been in Korea. I have
shown elsewhere that incentive mechanisms are, with few exceptions, much more
efficient instruments for influencing resource allocation. 14/
If the choice of preferred borrower categories is made purely on
social (or worse political) grounds, the choice of an incentive versus a
forced system is also a choice between budgetary subsidies and subsidization
through implicit taxation of the banking system. If the choice is made on
efficiency/market failure grounds, the choice between the two methods
similarly represents a choice between the government assuming the
risks inherent in identifying market failure, or transferring these risks to
the banking system. The experience of Korea shows the hazards of forcing
banks to subsidize society and to take on the risks that the government should
bear.
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As noted in the introduction, credit policy has been one of the
instruments used by the government in its export oriented development
strategy, which started in the 1960s. Ai_ort-term loans were automatically
available to any exporter with a valid letter of credit. These covered the
entire gamut of production, inventories and bills receivable from foreign
importers. Long-term loans included foreign currency loans, Exim Bank loans
for import on credit and equipment loans for export industries. A major
element of the incentive structure was 100 rediscounting by the central bank
(BOK) of loans for export support and over 70% for export bills (Table A5).
This below market rate discounting represented a true interest subsidy or
incentive policy. Elements of forced lending included loan interest ceilings,
and explicit or implicit pressure on managers. As elements of both were used
to implement this scheme rigorous separation of the two is difficult.
Evidence of the success of the reoriented development strategy, and the
economic success of the export drive came fairly quickly. Under these
circumstances, the coercive elements of the policy would tend to become
redundant rapidly (i.e. interest ceilings become nonbinding). This would be
reinforced by the fact that large conglomerates, which usually obtain the best
terms, played a major role in the export drive. I would judge, therefore,
that with the possible exception of new and small exporters, interest ceilings
on these loans were not effective, and therefore the element of coercion was
minimal, during the 60s and early 70s.
The practice of automatic rollover of the short term debt of corporate
borrowers who were able to repay 20% of loan amount is consistent with this
conclusion. Given the absence of strong cyclical fluctuation, and the high
growth rates, this represented a rational conclusion that current liquidity
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did not necessarily reflect future income and repayment possibilities. A
lower bound to the extent of automatic rollover is obtained by comparing
the equipment loans and term loans of the deposit money banks. As shown in
Table A27, in 1972 and 1973 equipment loans were 10% and 14%, while term loans
were only 3% and 2% of total banking fund loans. The difference of 7-12%
probably represents virtually unconditional rollover. To this must be added
various levels of conditional rollover implicit in the 20% repayment criteria.
Starting from the mid-1970s, there is evidence of the increasing role
of forced lending in the governments allocation policy. This change is
associated with the governments strategy of bringing about a structural change
in industry by developing heavy and chemical industries (hereafter HC). Though
the electronics industry was included in this strategy, it does not really fit
under the HC label, and any conclusions drawn with respect to HC industries do
not necessarily apply to it. Table A28 shows that between 1978 and 1981
approximately 50% of the total loans of the deposit money banks were "directed
loans". Yang (1982) has estimated that 92% of directed/preferential loans
allocated to the manufacturing sector were earmarked for the HC industries
during the 1978-1980 period.
An important, though not the only, instrument of the forced lending
policy was the National Investment Fund (NIF). Some idea of the economic
problems arising from the lending policy towards the HC industries can
therefore be obtained from available NIF statistics. Table 6 (below) shows
that the governments subsidy to the NIF increased from 2.2 billion Won in 1974
to 43 billion Won in 1979. Appendix Table A29 shows the repayment
performance of the HC industries in terms of cumulated repayments
and cumulated new loans. This measure is used so as to minimize the effect of
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differences in loan terms, data for which is not available. If we ignore
defense industries in which both quantities and prices are determined by
government defense policy, the highest repayment rate in 1982 was 26%. The
shipbuilding industry had the lowest repayment rate of 13% (1982). Available
data on capacity utilization rates in manufacturing sub-sectors confirms that
the problem is not restricted to NIF loans. Park's (1983) data shows that
during the entire 1975-1980 period, the Transport equipment and Machinery sub-
sectors had the lowest capacity utilization rates. In 1980 the rates were 44%
and 42% respectively.
Table 6: Government Coverage of NIF Deficits: Unit Bi. Won
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
2.2 5.3 10.5 15.6 18.2 43.0 40.0 40.0
The result of the forced lending policy of the government was that the
banks entered the eighties with a substantial proportion of what were
euphuistically referred to as "Non-Performing" loans. With their asset
structure undermined, commercial banks could have become a prey to a crises of
confidence in the banking system, but for the fact that they were largely
government owned. As it was, the oil shock of 1979-80 magnified the problem
to an extent that it became a serious problem even for the government, and
constrained its freedom to undertake monetary policy.
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Section 6. Monetary Policy in a Constrained Financial System
6.1 Consequences of the Oil-Shock
The oil shock of 1979-80 resulted in an inflation rate (GNP deflator)
of 19.3% in 1979 and 23.8% in 1980. It also led to the first serious reces-
sion in the Korean economy, with a growth rate of -6.2% in 1980. Even though
the growth rate of GNP rebounded sharply in 1981 to reach 6.4% recessionary
conditions in world markets continued to affect export markets and producing
sectors connected with them. Though the recession in developed country
markets may be predominantly a cyclical phenomenon the slowing of the growth,
in the middle eastern markets, probably had a more permanent effect on
previously fast growing export sectors such as construction.
The preceding decade had been characterized by sustained high economic
growth and fairly high inflation, an environment to which banking practices
had adapted. In such an environment the nominal market value of assets held
by borrowers was quite rationally expected to increase steadily over time.
This was reflected in Banking practices which treated 100% of the current
market value of assets as collateral. Banks were also not unduly perturbed by
the apparently high Debt to Net-Worth (Book Value) ratios which have so
worried outside observers. Given the rate of inflation, and the provision of
accelerated depreciation book value of equity overstates the true Debt to Net
Worth ratios.
The unexpected and prolonged decline in the rate of growth of many
export sub-sectors and in the absolute demand in some has severely affected
many firms in these sectors. A financial system attuned to steady growth had
not developed expertise and experience in differentiating between short term
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and long term effects. Faced with the consequences of this shock the
difficult judgement of cyclical versus long term consequences was probably
weighted too heavily towards the former. Though income and growth prospects
had declined in several sub-sectors, as had the market value of collateralized
industrial assets, borrowing and lending activities adjusted much more
slowly. Loans continued to be rolled over as before, and in some cases even
increased to meet what were wrongly perceived as short-term liquidity
problems. This resulted in a reduction in firm bankruptcies below what they
would otherwise have been, but increased the probability of future loan
defaults.
6.2 Policy Response and Consequences: A Financial Perspective
On the financial side interest rate ceiling were raised sharply in
early 1980 to cope with inflationary pressures arising from the oil price rise
(from about 18.6$/bbl to in 1979 to 30.5$/bbl in 1980). Time deposit rate
ceiling for deposit money banks were raised from 18.6% to 24.0%. Similarly
the basic loan rate - the discount rate for commercial bills and the interest
rate for general fund loans was raised from 18.5 to 24.5 for prime
enterprises.
A gradual change in the official attitude toward inflation, starting
in 1980, was given effective operational content by a sharp reduction in Ml
growth in the latter half of 1981. Ml growth was 25.4%, - 5.8% and 4.6% in
the second, third and fourth quarters of 1981 respectively, over that of a
year earlier. The rate of inflation declined to 18.1% in 1981 at least partly
as a consequence of this policy.
The fact that M2 continued to grow at 24% to 25% over the last three
quarters of 1981 seems to belie this reasoning, however. To the extent the
unofficial financial market rates can be taken seriously the expLanation seems
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to lie in relative interest rate changes. Table 7 (derived from Table Al)
gives the 1 year time deposit rates of deposit money banks. It shows, that
the ratio of Bank TD rates to the informal market rate rose from 0.43 in the
fourth quarter of 1979, to 0.56 in the 4th Quarter of 1980. This ratio
remained at a historically high average of 0.55 over 1981. This change in
relative interest rates would tend to shift funds from the informal into the
formal markets. An approximate estimate of this shift can be obtained by
using a portfolio equation estimated earlier for data from 1964-1 to
1979-4 15/. Taking account of the direct as was well as lagged effects of
relative interest (TD&UFM) rate changes from the 1st quarter of 1980 to the
3rd quarter of 1981 these would have the effect of increasing real time
deposits (TD/CPI) by 35%.
Table 7: Ratio of TD to Unofficial Market Rates - Quarterly
1979 1980 1981 1982
4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st
0.43 0.46 0.49 0.54 0.56 0.53 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.46
The formal banking system was it appears, largely spared the effects
of the tight money policy during 1981. It therefore had sufficient funds to
continue supporting its traditional clients during this period. By early
1982, there was a growing realization of the extent of the real problem of
potential firm failure. This was reflected during the 1st half of 1982, in a
sharp change in the loan portfolio away from construction, one of the worst
affected sectors. As Table A30 shows, the proportion of industry loans of
deposit money banks going to construction fell from 12.8% at end 1981 to 9.9%
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at end June 1982. During this period therefore the firms closest to the verge
of bankruptcy were increasingly pushed to the curb market.
This factor combined with the diversion of funds away from the curb to
the formal markets resulted in a progressive crunch in the curb market. A
major manifestation of this was probably the drying up of traditional channels
both formal and informal, for the high risk firms. I have shown how adverse
selection problems can lead to elimination of markets for sets of
borrowers. 161 Risk taking lenders and desperate borrowers opened new
channels and used unconventional methods, which first came to light in the
curb market scandal of May 1982, and were probably a major causative factor.
The banks did not escape the consequences entirely. Partly because of the
delayed effect of the recessionary conditions, and partly as a consequence of
the curb manipulation, the earlier overhang of non-performing loans was
starting to worsen.
In June 1982 the government undertook a major realignment of the
interest rate structure. Interest rate ceilings applicable to the deposits
and loans of the deposit money banks were lowered. Similar adjustments were
also made in the ceilings applicable to other institutions. To an extent this
was merely an adjustment of nominal rates in line with inflation. Ceilings
which had been raised in 1980 to reflect higher inflation were periodically
lowered from mid-1980 to mid-1982 to reflect the declining rate in 1981 and
1982. An unstated but important objective of lowering loan rates was to
reduce the interest costs of potentially bankrupt firms and thus to provide
more time for recovery. As discussed earlier the reduction of DMB loan rates
to lOX and deposit rates to 8% had an adverse effect on bank profitability.
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6.3 Monetary Policy Reversal
The decline in bank loan and deposit rates was not matched by an
equivalent fall in rates in unofficial markets during the second half of
1982. Table A2 shows that the ratio of Time Deposit rates to informal loan
rates fell from about .41 in the 1st half to about .28 in the second half of
1982. Thus the forced lending policy (previous section) required a loosening
of monetary policy to ease the tightening liquidity position of banks. This
combined-with the general desire to supply liquidity to firms through the
financial system led to a sharp increase in money supply. The growth rate,
which was 3.1% in 1982-1 and 13.5% in 1982-2 was stepped up sharply to 69% in
1982-3 and maintained at about 45% in the next two quarters. To the extent
that an anti-inflationary posture by the government was a relatively new
development, the earlier reduction in Ml growth was clearly overdone. It had
therefore played a role in accentuating the crises. Some easing of the
monetary growth policy was therefore called for. By the same token however,
the abrupt and sharp reversal had the potential of re-igniting inflationary
expectations. The public was likely to view this as proof of governments'
intentions regarding inflation and monetary control. Though inflation
continued to fall, to 18.1% in 1981, 8.0% in 1982 and 2.8% (est.) in 1983, the
decline in import prices probably played a major role in this decline.
The Money growth rate which had been increased in the second half of
1982 was maintained at a fairly high rate in early 1982. This was coupled
with selective public expenditure policies directed to the most affected
sector-construction. The result was to raise the share of Deposit Money Bank
loans going to the construction sector to 10.6 percent by end 1982 and 11.7 by
October 1983 (Table A30). Partly because of the revival in export and GNP
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growth and partly because of a perception that inflationary expectations were
reviving (wage rate growth) monetary policy was tightened again. The,growth
rate of Ml fell from 35Z in 1983-2nd quarter 13% in 1983-3rd quarter (both
over a year earlier). This was accomplished partly by reduction of Bank of
Korea rediscount ratio's on most loan categories.
There is an important lesson for monetary policy in the analysis
carried out so far. In this type of situation sharp reversals in monetary
policy are likely to have an adverse effect on both the firm bankruptcy and
the financial stability problem and on inflationary expectations. Too sharp a
tightening can itself induce an expectation of a subsequent reversal. A firm
but gradual policy of monetary tightening is therefor to be preferred.
6.4 Screening by Expected Returns
As analysed more fully in the appendix, when collateral value falls
virtually to zero as the result of a particularly severe and unanticipated
shock, borrowers became risk lovers, to the detriment of the lenders
(expected) repayment possibilities. To the extent that banks find it in their
interest to reduce sectoral exposure during a recession they also have the
problem of distinguishing between borrowers with relatively good and bad
future prospects (over a wide grey area). I have shown how this results in a
reduction in loans and an increase in interest rates to the entire set of
borrowers.-71 Government intervention may be necessary if it has better
information or a greater ability to obtain such information. The best
information is of course likely to be with firms within the sector.
Government can therefore provide incentives to eliminate bad firms within the
sector through take-over by the stronger firms. One way of accomplishing this
- 58 -
is for the government to subsidize the take over of repayment obligations. To
the extent that banks are also responsible, the costs may be shared by them
through partial write-off of bad loans. If, however, the forced lending
policy of the government is largely responsible for pressuring banks to lend
to unprofitable sectors against their judgement, it must take on a major part
of the costs. This seems to have been the case for certain heavy industries,
but not necessarily in the construction export sector. Though the Korean
authorities seem to have been slow in recognizing the magnitude of the problem
(not till September 1983) they seemed to have realized that this is good way
of solving the problem.
The moral hazard problem also becomes very acute for firms close to
bankruptcy. When firms are virtually bankrupt there is little additional cost
to them from failure to fulfill new obligations. They therefore become
willing to take loans at any interest rate. If lenders perceive the correct
situation they would quite correctly not be willing to give them new loans.
If the government has the correct information it should intervene before
individual banks lacking such information get overcommitted.
Because of mistakes of this type, or purely due to chance, particular
banks may be saddled with a much larger proportion of bad loans. This seems
to have been the case in Korea. The free market solution is to let banking
firms or other financial intermediaries suffer the consequences of their
actions or luck. Failure of one institution can have much more serious
consequences, however, for the public faith in and the future development of
the entire system. Thus in developed countries each intermediaries' action
can have strong external diseconomies on all others. This argues strongly for
all intermediaries sharing at least in the effect of adverse changes beyond
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their control. Government action is therefore necessary to spread the costs
of firm bankruptcy and nonrepayment. The Korean government did this by
providing liquidity to affected banks through the nonaffected ones so that the
latter will in effect share some of the risk faced by the former. In effect
the risk is pooled among the banks and the government. A better long term
solution would be to improve the loan guarantee system and to use subsidized
rediscounting instead of forced lending-interest ceilings policies to
influence the flow of credit.
6.5 The Curb Market
The sharp spurt in the rate of growth of real estate prices in 1983
was seen in Korea both as a cause and a symptom of rising inflationary
expectations. It was thought that land speculation could somehow thwart the
government's policy of controlling inflation through tight money policy.
Table A31 shows that the rate of growth of land prices declined progressively
from 1978 to 1982. In. particular the growth rate declined from 11.7% in 1980
to 5.4% in 1980, largely in line with the decline in inflation (Table 8).
There was however a sharp upturn in 1983 to 20%. A look at real land prices
suggests that the reversal may have started in 1982 (Table 8). As loans by
formal intermediaries for "speculative activities" are forbidden there exists
a suspicion that the phenomenon is connected with the Curb Market.
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Table 8: Rates of Growth (X) of Land Prices
1980 1981 1982 1983
test.)
Land Price Index 11.7 8.5 5.4 20
GNP deflator 23.8 18.1 8.0 2.8
Real land prices 
-10.1 -10.6 -2.6 +17.2
An examination of recent curb market rates in Table 8 and comparison
with rates in 1982 (Column A, Table Al) shows that they rose slightly in the
fourth quarter of 1982, then fell sharply in the first quarter of 1983, and
have been rising gradually since then. Comparison with commercial bank loan
rates (Column K, Table Al) shows that after the cut in loan ceiling in mid-
year the ratio of loan rates to the curb rates was at about .35 for the rest
of the year. This was the lowest ratio in more than three years. It suggests
that risk premia in informal markets increased sharply because of talk about
controlling these markets through various measures such as the introduction of
the real name system. By the first half of 1983 the ratio seems to have risen
to more normal levels (.43 to .49), suggesting a reduction in the risk
premium. As potential firm bankruptcy was still a serious problem, while the
recognition of this fact in financial markets was growing, it seems unlikely
that curb lending risk declined. An alternative hypothesis is that
potentially bankrupt firms were, at this stage, being almost totally excluded
from the traditional curb markets. The measured interest rate therefore
reflects only the reduced level of relatively lower risk transactions which
were being undertaken. The curb scandals of mid-1983 suggest that the only
way in which excluded borrowers could obtain loans was by opening new and
virtually illegal channels. The only condition under which lenders were
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prepared to make loans was with virtually complete repayment guarantees
through illegal collusion with bank personnel. In my view this was a
manifestation of the very difficult prevailing conditions. It is not, as many
people have come to believe, the standard and overwhelming method of operation
of the curb market during the 1980's.
If this hypothesis is correct, then it is very likely that traditional
curb market lenders shifted their portfolio composition towards real estate.
This could have been either by increasing loans to this sector, or more
likely, through direct investment. Both the rising curb market interest rates
and rising real estate prices during 1983 are a reflection of this
phenomenon. The introduction of the real name system for transactions and
increased capital gains taxes on real estate may be useful as a damper on
speculation. In my view, however, there was no cause for excessive alarm
about the effect of real estate speculation on anti-inflationary policy.
Section 7. Conclusions
Over the period analysed in the present paper, Korea appears to have
done a reasonably good job in setting the base level of controlled loan
interest rates. The most important factor in this success was the
governments' flexibility in adjusting rates to credit conditions. For this
purpose the Informal or Curb loan market served a useful function in providing
information on supply-demand conditions in financial markets. In effect the
government reached a good compromise between unstable and flexible rates.
Their experience suggests that the existence of an unregulated credit market
segment and access to information about it greatly facilitated this job. To
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reduce dependence on this source the government should completely free the
inter-bank call money market.
There seems to have been much less success in setting the structure
of loan interest rates. It was shown how an incorrect structure influenced the
evolution of the financial system; Both the relative growth of different
financial instruments, and the relative growth of different institutions.
Conventional analysis with its exclusive focus on "real rates" tends
to discount the great importance of an appropriate structure of loan interest
rates. An inappropriate structure of loan rates means that some segments of
the credit market face effective interest ceilings. I have shown elsewhere
that this tends to reduce loan amounts to these segments and to increase
collateral requirements. In Korea, this effected both the relative growth of
institutions more heavily involved in these segments and the development of
new instrument.
At least in recent years the spread between the average loan rates and
the average deposit rates of the banking system, has also been
inappropriate. This had a strong negative effect on the profitability of the
banking system, and reduced its flexibility in responding to external shocks.
Low profits for the banking system, particularly a nationalized one, often
have little immediate visible impact. These profits are therefore often
undermined by governments facing a tight budgetary situation. This can
gradually eat away at the vitality and professionalism of the banks. This can
effect the health and viability of a critical element of the financial system.
The interest ceilings inherent in the structure of loan interest
rates, and the type and range of business that particular institutions are
permitted to carry out,, interactively influenced the evolution of the
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financial system. Incentive policies such as subsidized rediscounting by the
central bank (BOK) were also a factor. These combined with implicit ceilings
on longer term and more risky loans effect the profitability and growth of
the specialized banks and development institutions. The former had a more
important (positive) effect on these institutions' development in the early
stages. As the information collection and market development potentialities
were exhausted, the latter effects began to predominate and slow down the
growth.
The banking system was the most important channel for implementing the
allocation policies of the government. It is the part of the financial system
most affected by interest ceilings and forced lending policies. In Korea this
was reflected in a declining share of total loans originating from them.
The permission granted by the government to them to offer repayment guarantees
on bonds issued by corporations opened an alternative channel which they
eagerly exploited. The phenomenal growth of this instrument has been one of
the important innovations in Korea's financial structure over the last
decade. As our analysis showed this was, for the banks, merely a means to
expand lending in a relatively unconstrained segment of the market. To
preserve the incentive structure in the long term, a reduction in the current
100% guarantee proportion is, however necessary. Serious moral hazard problems
can arise otherwise.
Another important development was the growth of the industrial and
commercial paper market. As in the case of guaranteed bonds interest ceilings
were relatively less binding. As only the short term investment and finance
companies were allowed to operate in this market, they grew rapidly. In both
cases the degree to which interest ceilings act as a constraint depend on the
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type of borrower. In contrast to the large corporate borrowers, the ceilings
were binding on the smaller more risky (from the lenders information
perspective) firms.
This in turn led to another important development; the growth of Trade
Credit given by the corporate sector. Analysis suggests that the corporate
sector increasingly acted as a financial intermediary channeling funds to its
non-corporate suppliers. The information advantage that it has in this
situation is clearly an important reason for this development, along with the
constraints imposed on the banks.
The nature of information problems in the equity market work in the
same direction. Large diversified conglomerates are correctly perceived by
the financial system as low average risk. In the constrained Korean system
they tended to act as internal capital markets, pooling risk across their
diverse activities. They could therefore allocate capital, with_some
limitation, to the most productive activities, even though the formal
allocation was for specific activities. In the initial stages of
development of equity and secondary security markets, these companies
still tend to act as closely held family concerns; using the flexibility to
optimize their intertemporal saving-consumption problem. Our analysis shows
that the largest corporations are beginning to emerge from this phase and act
more as conventional profit maximizers in developed markets. Evidence for
this is provided by the increasing activity in the secondary market for
their equities. This trend needs to be encouraged. A mutual fund containing
a mix of bonds and equities, which takes over the monitoring role for the
large number potential small investors is one step that can be taken in this
direction.
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Though methods exist for identifying market failure and the need for
government intervention in credit markets, these are often difficult to apply,
and perhaps for that reason are seldom applied. In addition they are not
completely adequate for dealing with completely new economic activities
such as some of the specific industries within the broadly defined Heavy and
Chemical industries, which were picked out by Korea. The results of such
intervention can be (and often are) quite bad.
Even if the methods are applied without social or political bias, for
both the above reasons, intervention can be risky, and the successes and
failures of Korea's experience illustrate this fact. Thus the correct choice
of (export) growth sectors in the 1960s was somewhat tarnished by mistakes in
the selection of certain heavy and chemical industries in the mid-1970s.
__ - - _-, 
The relative emphasis on incentive based versus forced lending
instruments applied to the banking system, have a major effect on who bears
this risk of intervention. Use of forced lending instruments transfers this
risk from the government budget to the banking system. The selection mistakes
coupled with increasing resort to forced lending policies resulted in an
increasing overhang of nonrepayment of loans. This considerably weakened the
banking systems ability to respond to adverse shocks. The 1980 oil shock
which affected internal, and particularly, export markets for Korean firms
created the threat of large scale firm bankruptcy. This in turn put an
unbearable strain on the weakened banking system.
In this situation, the exercise of monetary policy was severely
constrained. A sharp reduction in monetary growth heightened the bankruptcy
problem. The consequent reversal of policy led to inflationary expectations
which were then more difficult to control with subsequent tightening. The
lesson which emerged from this experience, is that a gradual and firm
tightening of monetary growth is preferable to radical departures which
may not be economically or politically sustainable.
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APPENDIX
Firm Bankruptcy and Bank Failure: The Role of Collateral
In an idealized capital market, perhaps approximated by the US one,
society benefits from firms going bankrupt. In fact, banks would force firms
into bankruptcy to collect at least the collateral value of their initial
loans and to write-off uncollectible debts. This view neglects several
informational problem which can arise, and seem to have arisen in Korea:
these are the Cyclical Variation in Collateral Value, Moral Hazard problems
which become particularly acute when bankruptcy is possible, Adverse Selection
arising from the difficulty of distinguishing between those with relatively
good and those with worse prospects, and negative externalities arising from
the failure (sometimes even suspected failure) of even one financial
institution.
Resale Value of Collateralized Assets
Markets for used capital goods are known to be very fragmentary even
in developed countries. Cyclical fluctuations in returns to different sectors
(or the economy) are, however, reflected fairly well in fluctuations in
expected future returns (stock prices) and the resale/collateral value of
capital assets. Stock prices are known to-be a leading indicator, and
collateralized equipment prices are probably a lagging one. In the presence
of rudimentary stock and used capital asset markets, banks or other lenders
are more likely to suffer a locking-in effect. That is, loans given when
current returns and asset value of equipment was high cannot be severely
reduced at or near the bottom of recessions, even if the expected future
income prospects appear to have worsened. This is because the collateral
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value has worsened even more, and it would not be worth declaring default.
This is particularly true when the severity or timing of the cyclical downturn
was unanticipated, or as seemed to have happened in Korea it was virtually
unanticipated shock.
When the cyclical recession in a particular sector or a group of
sectors is anticipated, banks or lenders will start trying to reduce their
loan portfolio exposure before the conditions materialize. Further each bank
or lender would prefer to be out first to get either the full repayment, or if
that is not possible the maximum resale value of the collateral. The
selection of firms for reducing loans is likely to be based most heavily on
current returns. This is likely to worsen their liquidity position. This may
result in failure of some firms which are basically sound, and acts as an
additional factor in speeding up the recession. Some form of government
intervention may then become necessary. To an extent, this happened with
international lending to Korea and in the absence of international government
the multilateral agencies (World Bank, IMF) had to intervene. This probably
staved of a preemptive reduction in private loans which would have accentuated
the shorter term crises.
When the downturn is due to a particularly severe and unanticipated
shock as seems to have been the case for some sectors such as construction, so
that collateral value falls virtually to zero, another problem arises. As
shown in the following Figures 6 and 7 18/, the repayment function changes
from being of form DCBA to DCBA' and the firm net return function from HGFE to
HGFE'. Technically this means that banks will now act as strictly risk averse
lenders and firms as risk loving borrowers.
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FIGURE 6 FIGURE 7
Firm Return
Repayment after Repayment
to Bank
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Return
TARLR Al: AVF.RAGR QUARTRRLY INTERVST RATF.S (S)
A B C ) 8 F C H I .1 L H N
UFI/ overdue Over- Call General Resold Discount TD Corporate Stock
(Curb) drafts Loans Bills & w/ Non Third Rates Bond Market 1 F H
Loans Recourse Party/ (Non Yields Returns A G A F
(60-90) Bank Household, (Yearly)
(Deposits) Guarantee (I Year)
1977 1 42.1 17.0 19.0 .40 .38 .85
2 40.5 17.0 19.6 .42 .3 .40 .83
3 35.5 25 17.0 20.0 15.0 19.6 19.71 16.2 20.2 15.84 .42 .76 .46 .83
4 34.0 25 17 20 15 19.6 19.71 14.3 20.0 .44 .76 .42 .73
1978 1 38.4 25 17 20 15 19.6 19.71 14.4 20.7 .39 .76 .38 .73
2 38.4 25 17 21.7 15 19.8 20.0 18.0 20.6 11.5 .39 .75 .47 .91
3 43.2 25 20.0 22.0 18.0 20.6 21.0 18.6 20.6 .42 .86 .43 .90
4 46.8 25 20.5 20.3 18.5 20.6 21.0 18.6 22.2 .40 .88 .40 .90
1979 1 44.0 25 20.5 19.0 18.5 20.7 21.0 18.6 26.0 .42 .88 .42 .90
2 42.1 25 20.5 19 18.5 20.9 21.0 18.6 26.8 16.5 .44 .88 .44 .89
3 40.7 25 20.5 19. 18.5 21.8 24.3 18.6 26.9 .45 .76 .46 .85
4 42.7 25 20.5 19. 18.5 24.5 25.0 18.6 27.1 .43 .74 .44 .76
1980 1 50.8 29.4 2S.7 24.3 23.7 25.1 28.9 23.3 30.5 .47 .82 .46 .93
2 48.8 29.7 26.5 24.7 24.5 29.2 28.2 24.0 31.9 17.92 .50 .87 .49 .82
3 42.3 29.0 25.4 23.7 23.4 28.7 25.2 22.9 29.7 .55 .93 .54 .80
4 37.7 27.8 22.7 20.8 20.7 24.1 24.7 21.4 28.1 .55 .84 .56 .89
1981 1 36.6 27.0 21.5 20.0 19.5 23.1 23.1 19.5 24.9 -. 53 .84 .53 .84
2 35.2 27. 20.9 20. 19.5 21.7 22.1 19.5 27.7 17.03 .55 .88 .55 .89
3 34.7 27. 20.5 20. 19.5 21.6 21.6 19.5 22.9 .56 .90 .56 .90
4 33.6 26.4 19.6 18.1 18.6 21.6 21.6 19.0 27.0 .55 .86 .56 .88
1982 1 32.6 24.1 15.8 16.1 15.7 18.7 19.1 15.1 21.7 .48 .84 .42 .81
2 31.1 22.0 14.0 16.0 13.5 13.9 16.4 12.5 17.4 10.04 .43 .82 .40 .90
3 27.7 18.0 10.0 14.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 8.0 14.3 .36 .83 .29 .73
4 29.0 18.0 10.0 14. 10. 11.0 12.0 8.0 15.7 .34 .83 .27 .73
1983 1 20.3 (22.4) 18. 10. 14. 10. 11.0 12.0 8.0 14.8 .49 (.45) .83 .39 .73
2 21.7 (23.2) 18. 10. 14. 10. 11.0 12.0 8.0 14.0 .46 (.43) .83 .37 .76
3 10.5 12.0 8.0 14.0
1/ Figures in brackets represent alternative UPM data.
UPN: Unorganized Financial Markets
Source: Bank of Korea
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Table A2 (II): MAJOR INTEREST RATES ON LOANS AND DISCOUNTS OF DEPOSIT NONEY BANKS
In Per Cent Per Annum
Snmll and Nedoim Industry
B a a k I n a r u n d G o v e r na e n t F u n d F o r e n L o a n F u n d
Nedim Equipment Cooperative Cooperativem
Effective From Industries of Nedium Business Equipment Businese Operation AID XPW PAC
1977. 7. 1 A 16.0 16.0 - 17.0 16.0 13.5 13.5 17.0 8.0 9.0 8.0
s 17.0
10. 4 A 15.0 15.0 16.0 15.0 13.5 13.0 14.0 8.0 9.0 8.0
B 16.0
1978. 6. 13 A 18.5 18.5 - 19.5 18.5 13.5 13.0 14.0 8.0 9.0 8.0
a 19.0
1980. 1. 12 A 24.5 24.5 - 25.0 24.5 19.5 19.0 20.0 8.0 9.0 8.0
5 25.0
1980. 6. 5 A 23.5 23.5 - 25.0 23.5 21.0 21.0 21.0 8.0 9.0 8.0
B 24.0
9. 16 A 21.5 21.5 - 23.0 21.5 20.0 20.0 20.0 8.0 9.0 8.0
5 22.0
11. 8 A 19.5 19.5 - 21.0 19.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 8.0 9.0 8.0
B 20.0
1981. 11. 9 A 18.5 18.5 - 20.0 - 17.5 17.5 17.5 8.0 9.0 '8.0
819.0
11. 30 A 17.5 17.5 - 19.0 - 17.5 17.5 17.5 8.0 9.0 8.0
B 18.0
12. 29 A 16.5 16.5- 18.0 - 16.5 16.5 16.5 8.0 9.0 8.0
B 17.0
1982. 1. 14 A 15.5 15.5 - 17.0 - 16.5 16.5 16.5 8.0 9.0 8.0
B 16.0
3. 29 A 13.5 13.5 - 15.0 - 14.0 14.0 14.0 8.0 9.0 8.0
B 14.0
6. 28 10.0 10.0 - 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.0 9.0 8.0
Source: Economic Statietice Yearbook BOK
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TABLE A3: INTEREST RATES OF DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS BY MATURITY (%)
A B C D E F G
<1 Yr 1-3 Yrs B/A >3 Yrs D/A Average 4 Quarter
-Date D/A for Average of F
Quarter
1974 12.7 15.5 15.5 1 15.5 1
1975 1.000
4.17 15.0 15.5 1.033 15.5 1.027
1.033 1.015
10.1 15.5 15.5 1 15.5 1 1.000
1976 1
8.2 17.0 17 1 18 1.059 1.039 1.025
1.059
1977 1.059
1.059 1.052
7.1 16.0 16 1 17 1.063 1.063
10.4 15.0 15 1 16 1.067 1.067
1.067
1978 6.13 18.5 18.5 19.5 1.054 1.064 1.060
12.7 18.5 18.5 19.5 1.054 1.054
1.054
1979 1.12 18.5 18.5 19.5 1.054 1.054
1.054 1.054
1.054
1980 1.42 24.5 24.5 25.5 1.041 1.042
6.5
8.1 23.5 23.5 1 25.5 1.043 1.042
9.16 21.5 21.5 1 22.5 1.047 1.044 1.045
11.8 19.5 29.5 1 20.5 1.051 1.051
1981 4.4 19.5 19.5 1' 20.5 1.051 1.051
11.9 18.5 18.5 1 19.5 1.054 1.051
11.30 17.5 17.5 1 18.5 1.057 1.051 1.052
12.29 16.5 16.5 1 17.5 1.061 1.054
1982 1.44 15.5 15.5 1 16.5 1.065 1.065
3.29 13.5 13.5 1 14.5 1.074 1.072 1.034
6.28 10 10 1 10 1 1
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TABLE A4: COMMERCIAL BANK CREDITS BY MATURITY
(X)
Total
(amount in
Up to 1 year 1-3 years over 3 years billion won)
City Banks
1975 70.9 14.5 14.6 100.0
(1,378)
1976 75.1 11.3 13.6 100.0
(1,851)
1977 67.9 17.2 14.9 100.00
(2,356)
1978 64.7 21.8 13.5 100.0
(3,386)
1979 66.8 21.1 12.1 100.0
(4,596)
1980 69.4 20.5 10.1 100.0
(5,908)
1981 68.0 18.7 13.3 100.0
(7,720)
1982 69.9 14.3 15.8 (9400.8)
Local Banks
1975 88.8 6.7 4.5 100.0
(267)
1976 82.8 12.3 4.9 100.0
(349)
1977 81.8 11.4 6.8 100.0
(439) -
1978 73.2 18.5 8.3 100.0
(593)
1979 70.2 21.8 8.0 100.0
(744)
1980 63.9 29.9 6.2 100.0
(952)
1981 64.6 28.5 6.9 100.0
(1,295)
1982
Note: Figures for 1975, 1976 relate to end September; for 1977-81 relate to
end December.
Source: BOK.
TABLE A5: R E D I S C O U N T R A T I O O F B A N K OF K O R E A
During Quarter
01/06/79 01/12/79 June-Sept. 79 07/03/80 1981 02/19/81±1 06/03/81 07/08/81 05/20/82 06/10/82 02/24/83 06/08/83
Comrcial Bills
Smel medius Induatry Y 2I 70 60 70 80 80 80
Heavy Industry ?/ 70 60 60 60 60 60
Export 70 80
Others From 70t to SOZ 60 50 40 60 40 40
Loans
Finance of Export Support 100 (7) 80 80 70
Fund for Knergy 100 100 80 70
Conservation Facility 80
Defense Industry 
80 70
Fishery Sector 50-60 60 50
Small & Medium Enterprises 
30(7) 30 20
(+ 50 of excess
over 35S)
0 BOK set guidelines for special financial support to SKI amount to be supplied during the year - 300 Billions Won
of which 30 Billion Won low-interest loans; 30 Billion Won special fostering funds; 240 Billion Won general loans.(Medium Industry bank exclusively handles special low-interest loans and special fostering loans). (CitizensNational Bank, Five Nation-Wide City Bank and ten local bank can offer general loans). More than 302 of loans maybe lent on credit or on guarantee by the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund.
]/ Rediscount ceiling on comercial bills received by small and medium industry raised from 0.3 to 0.4 Billions forprim enterprises and from 0.2 to 0.3 billions for enterprises vtth ordinary rating.
]/ Increases of the rediscount ceiling on commercial bills received by eligible heavy and chemical enterprises from1.5 Billions Won to 2 Billions for prim enterprises; from 1.0 Billion to 1.5 Billions for ordinary enterprises.
r/ lonetsry Board abolished old regulation on handlitng discount and sales of commercial bills. BOK automatic
rediscount system abolished. Rediscount ceilLng were set for each banking Institution.
Source: BOK
TABLE A6: PRIVATE CORPORATIONS: STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (A) & LIABILITIES (L) (%)
1982 1981 1980 1978 1975
A L A L A L A L A L
Money 8.2 - 6.7 - 7.5 - 9.1 - 9.4 -
Deposits T & s 7.5 - 12.1 - 15.6 - 19.0 - 20.7 -
Interest & Finance 3.7 - 2.9 - 2.9 - 3.1 - 1.4 -
Ind. Papers 4.5 10.1 3.4 9.3 - - - - - -
Securities 9.4 37.3 8.3 37.0 9.5 40.1 9.6 36.9 9.1 36.1
Debentures 1.6 13.5 1.5 12.0 1.4 11.6 0.8 6.2 0.5 1.7
Stocks 5.2 24.1 4.6 25.0 5.8 28.5 5.7 30.7 7.7 34.4
Loans
Trade Credit 39.7 18.3 37.9 19.7 33.1 18.1 23.1 15.7 21.3 18.9
Bank - 52.4 - 53.5 - 53.8 - 52.0 - 58.9
Investment &
Finance Cos. - 6.6 - 6.3 - 5.7 - 6.4 - 5.3
Others - 24.7 - 23.3 - 22.8 - 17.7 - 13.9
Source: Flow of Funds Tables, Economic Statistics Yearbooks (various issues).
Note : The assets/liabilities listed on the left are not exhaustive, so that
numbers in each column do not add up to 100%.
- 76 -
TABLE A7: INDIVIDUAL PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION (%)
1982 1981 1980 1978 1975
Assets
Money 9.5 9.2 12.7 16.9 19.9
Deposits
Time & Savings 41.7 39.8 38.9 37.3 35.9
Investment &
Finance Cos. 1.7 2.2 2.8 3.6 3.4
Insurance 7.0 5.9 5.4 4.0 3.7
Trust 3.95 4.3 4.4 3.0 3.6
Ind. Papers 4.1 5.1 -
Securities 30.4 31.6 32.1 31.3 29.4
Debentures 3.2 3.3 3.3 1.7 1.1
Stocks 15.94 18.0 21.0 24.1 24.8
Beneficiaries 7.8 5.2 3.4 1.9 0.3
Other Loans 0.7 0.8 1.3 2.4 2.3
Liabilities
Bank Loans 25.7 24.3 25.9 24.4 28.8
Other Loans 9.1 9.0 8.1 5.6 4.7
Trade Credits 17.4 15.9 13.2 5.7 2.0
Equities 0.5 0.5 0.6
Other than Stock
Source: Flow of Funds tables from Economic Statistics Yearbooks.
TABLE As PRWPORTION OF INSTITUTION'S ASSETS TO TOTAL ASSETS OF FIANIAL INSTITUTIONS 1X
COURCIAL BANKS SPECIALIZED BANKS DEVELOPMENT INSlITUTIONS SAVING INSTIIUTIONS INVESTMENT INSTITUTIONS LIFE INSURANCE CONPANIES
1972 42.3 35.1
1973 45.6 37.6
1974 47.6 30.0
1975 49.4 26.3 13.1 5.7 
4.3 1.6
1976 45.5 25.5 13.3 6.2 
5.1 1.5
1977 42.7 27.0 13.2 6.7 
5.9 1.7
1978 6q.1 26.8 12.9 6.9 
7.3 1.9
1979 42.6 27.2 13.8 7.0 
7.5 2.5
1980 40.0 27.9 13.6 9.2 
7.9 2.6
1981 38.7 26.7 14.6 8.1 
8.9 2.8
1m 37.1 27.0 13.8 8.1 
10.6 3.3
TABLE A9: FINANCIAL SYSTeN: SoUBRCS OF FINANCE (Billion Won)
1982 S of 1981 2 of 1980 % of 1979 S of 1978 l of 1977 S of 1976 S of 1975 l of 1974 S of
Tot a 1-2Y Tota1-/ Total Total Total Total Total-/ Total- Total
A - Loans a Credits 69.8 70.7 72.3 71.6 69.4 70.4 72.1 73.9
(70.6)2k (71.4) (73.6) (70.6) (73.2)
rtant Loans 23,93R.9 43.8 19,003.5 44.2 14,462.9 46.7 10,818.7 48.4 7,678.7 50.3 5,265.4 49.1 4,249 53.0 3,338.524 (55.6) 2,619 55.01Insurance Loans- 1,409.4 2.6 890.5 2.1 603.0 2.0 407.0 I.R 179.4 1.1 105.7 0.9 0,051 40.250 0,148 3.1Investment & Finance
Coupany Loans 1,813.4 3.3 1,467.4 3.4 997.3 3.2 901.5 4.0 637.9 4.2 393.5 3.7 0.303 4.0 192.693 ( 3.2) -
Other Loans (includes
Dew. Banks) 11,195.8 20.5 8,650.1 20.1 6,294.3 20.3 4,183.2 18.7 2,901.6 19.0 1,969.0 18.4 1,326 16.0 1,007.632 (16.8) 0,919 19.4Covernment Loans 4,721.1 8.7 3,741.1 8.7 :2,604.5 8.4 2,016.4 9.0 1,433.7 9.4 961.5 9.0 0,712 502.662 ( 8.4) 0,431 9.1Trade Credits 11,505.6 21.1 9.273.0 21.6 5.999.8 19.4 4.028.9 18.0 2.441.3 16.0 2,020.4 18.9 1,397 17.0 918.487 (15.3) 0.643 14.0Sub-Total 54,586.8 100 43,025.6 100 22,355.7 300 15,272.8 100 8,038 100 10,715.5 100 8,038 100.0 6,000.248 (100.0) 4,735 100.0
a - Securitles 20,967.3 26.8 15,778.3 25.9 11,846.4 27.7 8,853.6 28.4 6,724.7 30.6 4,504.3 29.6 3,103.5 27.9
mon Flnancial 20,195.7 (2 6 .1>3/1 5 ,17 9 .9 (25.2) 11,093.4 (26.4) 6,355.5 (29.4) 2,942.6 (26.8)
C - Industrtal Papers 2,644.5 3.4 2,030.3 4.4
D - Totol (A + 1 + C) 200 100 100 100 100 100 100
00
A S Rank Loans 25.97 31.34 33.56 41.02 80.7 62.24 1
A S Interest & Finance 8.76 67.19 10.63 41.32 110.53Company
A S Other Loans 29.43 37.38 50.51 44.17 118.8 44.29
A S Trade Credit 24.08 54.56 48.92 51.39 20.50 117.26
I/ Insurance loans + trust loans.
2/ For different types of loans, 'total refers to total loans and credits or the
tow titled 'sub-total'. For different methods of ftntncing (loans, securities,
Industrial Papers), 'total" refers to total of these.
For 2 In brackets only mn-financial securities are constdered.
Sources: Yearly Statistical Pook - 801
rABLE AlO: FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: ASSET PROPORTIONS (Z)
Commercial Special Comercial Life Development Savings Investment Financial
Date Banks Banks + Special Insurance Institutions Institutions Institutions Total Institutions
'Total Assets
1982 37.1 27.0 64.1 3.3 13.8 8.1 10.6 99.9 38.30
1981 38.7 26.7 65.4 2.8 14.6 8.1 8.9 99.8 37.64
1980 40.0 27.9 67.9 2.6 13.6 8.2 7.8 100.0 37.4
1979 42.6 27.2 69.8 2.5 13.8 7.0 7.5 100.6 36.77
1978 42.1 26.8 68.9 1.8 12.9 6.9 7.3 97.8 37.07
1977 42.7 27.0 69.7 1.7 13.2 6.6 5.9 97.2 35.46
1976 45.5 25.5 71.0 1.5 13.3 6.2 5.1 97.1 34.00
1975 49.4 26.3 75.7 1.6 13.1 5.7 4.3 100.4 33.83
1974 47.6 30.0 77.6 36.37
1973 45.6 37.7 83.3 34.85
1972 42.3 35.1 77.4 34.14
TABLE All: Distribution of Securities Trade Credit and Commercial Paper by Holders (%)
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OUTSTANDING AT END OF YEAR 1982
Commercial Specialized Other Financial Private Govt. Invest.
Banks Banks Institution Corporations Corporation Individual T 0 T A L
A L A L A L A L A L A L A L
Securities 11 3 8 1 23 19 12 46 1 8 45 - 100 77Govt. Bonds 28 - 21 - 21 - 9 - 0.1 - 15 - 94.1 -Debentures 9 - 3 - 57 il - 9 75 - 25 22 - 100 100
Stocks 3 8 2 0.5 9 7 17 77 3 7 63 - 97 99.5Trade Credit 
- - - - - - 90 42 7 4 - 49 97 95
Industrial papers - - - - 5 - 45 100 0.2 - 49 - 99 100(C.P.) 
- - - - 2 - 13 100 1 - 84 - 100 100
0-
FINANCIAL ASSETS & LIABILITIES OUTSTANDING AT END OF 1981
2
Securities 11 3 10 1 20 13 11 50 2 10 46 - 100 77Govt. Bonds 26 - 17 - 16 - 8 - I - 27 - 95 -
Debentures 6 - 2 - 55 - 11 89 - 11 26 - 100 100Stocks 3 7 2 0.4 9 5 13 72 3 16 57 - 87 100
Trade Credit - - - - - - 89 46 9 6 - 41 98 93Industrial papers - - - - 4 - 36 100 0.3 - 60 - 96.3 100(C.P) 
- - - - 0.1 - 17 100 - - 83 - 100 100
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OUTSTANDING AT END 1978
Securities 7 4 11 - - 10 13 52 2 14 45 - 78 80Govt. Bonds 5 1 28 - 15 - 11 - - - 11 - 70 1Debentures 7 - 2 - 53 - 13 95 0.0 5 25 - 100 100Stocks 5 6 0.4 0.1 9 3 13 70 3 21 55 - 85.6 100
Trade Credit 
- - - - - - 89 61 8 7 - 23 97 91
1/ Mainly Investment Institutions
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TABLE A.12: COMMERCIAL BANKS: GuaraLtee on Bonds
A B C
Loans from Bond B/(A+B)
Banking Funds Guarantees
1973 987.1 .30 .03
1974 1,534.1 5,37 0.35
1975 1,847.2 22.47 1.20
1976 2,332.3 91.88 3.79
1977 2,867.1 205.82 6.70
1978 4,050.8 374.42 8.46
1979 5,401.8 664.49 10.95
1980 7,209.8 1,234.1 14.62
1981 9,544.4 1,595.65 14.32
1982 11,800.6 1,987.84 14.42
1983-9 13,062.8 2,613.60 16.67
Source: Monthly Review, Securities Supervisory Board
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TABLE A13: SIZE OF INDUSTRIAL PAPER MARKET (BI-WON, 5)
Industrial Papers Industrial Papers (%) Industrial Papers (%
Flow Stock Loans & Credits Securities
(Total)
1974 43.3 2.6
1975 40.4 83.7 1.4 4.0
1976 56.1 139.8 1.7 4.5
1977 95.5 235.3 2.2 5.2
1978 65.7 301.0 2.0 4.5
1979 209.4 510.4 2.3 5.8
1980 576.2 1,086.6 3.5 9.2
1981 943.7 2,030.3 4.7 12.9
1982 614.1 2,644.5 4.8 12.6
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbooks
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TABLE A14: INVESTMENT AND FINANCE COMPANIES (BI-WON)
Assets & Resold Bills Presold Bills
Liabilitiesl/ Assets
1975 220.9 73.8 .334
1976 345.6 137.5 .398
1977 471.5 226.7 .484
1978 685.3 280.4 .409
1979 931.2 479.6 .515
1980 1,214.4 1,025.9 .845
1981 1,610.5 1,972.0 1.225
1982 2,150.2 2,327.5 1.083
1983-9 2,824.5 2,973.0 1.053
1/ Does not include Resold Bills.
Source: BOK Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
TABLE A15: AMOUNTS AND RATIOS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF BONDS OUTSTANDING
(in billion Won or %)
A B C D E F G
Gov't.& Gov't. Corporate Guaranteed Non-Guaranteed C/A D/C
Corporate Bonds Bonds Corporate Bonds
Bonds Bonds
1972 3.60 6.33 36.26
1973 5.30 8.08 39.62
1974 15.87 15.75 50.19
1975 121.52 60.22 61.32 38.12 23.20 50.5 62.17
1976 268.19 139.96 128.23 117.53 10.70 47.8 91.78
1977 419.88 133.82 286.06 285.51 .55 68.1 99.81
1978 848.21 257.81 590.40 562.90 27.50 69.6 95.34
1979 1393.87 283.72 1109.95 1,051.45 58.50 79.6 94.73
1980 2196.04 356.87 1839.17 1838.67 50 83.8 99.97
1981 3109.20 532.93 2576.28 2,512.48 53.80 82.9 97.52
1982 4126.55 714.80 3411.75 3,321.95 89.80 97.0 97.40
1983-9 5127.17 693.42 4433.75 4,395.75 38.00 86.5 99.14
Rate of
Growth 65.5 42.4 77.6 89
1975-82
(compound)
TABLE A 16: ANNUALISED YIELDS ON DIFFERENT TYPE OF BONDS
A B C D
Government Bonds Public Corporate
Grain Housing Industrial
Finance A/D B/D C/D
1975 - 21.4 21.1 20.1 - 1.06 1.05
1976 - 22.4 21.4 20.4 - 1.09 1.04
1977 18.2 22.6 21.0 20.1 0.91 1.12 1.04
1978 20.1 22.9 22.6 21.1 0.95 1.09 1.07
1979 24.3 26.7 25.7 26.7 0.91 1.00 0.96
1980 27.7 30.1 28.3 30.1 0.92 1.00 0.94 1
1981 21.1 23.6 24.6 24.4 0.86 0.97 1.01 X
1982 16.5 17.2 17.7 16.8 0.98 1.02 1.05
1983 - 13.0 15.2 14.2 - .92 1.07
2/
Mean - 21.3 23.4 22.8 22.5
Std. 4.10 3.78 3.30 4.30
Cov. 19.24% 26.19% 14.46% 19.14
Corr. .97 .99 1.0
Std. = Standard Deviation
I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Cov. = Coefficient of VariationI 1983 data are for first nine months only. Corr. = Correlation Co-efficient
2/ Column A statistics are for 1977-82 rest are for 1975-82.
Source - BOK Monthly Statistical Bulletin
Table A17: COMPPOSITION OF THE SECONDARY AND TERTIARY MARKET
(Unit million won)
Year
or Value of Value of RepoMonth Stock Sales Sales and Repurchase
1978 1,741,506 238,6821979 1,327,813 523,270
1980 1,134,019 889,8761981 2,534,160 1,410,5231982 1,973,469 6,247,5481983.6 1,072,527 2,119,800
Source: Korea Stock Exchange.
Table A 18: BOND TRADING UNDER REPURCHASE OR REVERSE REPURCHASE AGREEKENTS
(In mll. won) 0
11. Repo
8. Secondary utsndtngYear Under Reverse 3. Outstanding Under Repurchase 6. Outstanding Harket 9. Tertiary Listedor Repurchase Agreement at Year or 8eeeent at Year or 7. Total Activity Activity 10. Donth 1. Purchase 2. Sales Month End 4. Sales 5. Repurchase Month End Outstanding (1+4) (2+5) Balance ofCiBnda
1977 15,418 13,5 li18 500 
- 500 2,318 15,918 13,500 15,283 0.68S1978 201,759 178,848 24,729 861 990 372 25,1U1 302.620 382,458 22,911 5.84X1979 324,906 337,079 12,556 1,021 1,392 
- 12,566 325,927 664,398 
-12,173 2.3311980 284,758 278,402 18,912 500 500 
- 18,912 285,258 564,160 6,358 2.1121981 313,365 306,981 25,295 5,105 5,105 
- 25,295 318.470 630,556 6,384 1.6531982 Jan. 34,812 46,347 13,760 
-
-
Feb. 36,099 30,281 19,577 
-
Mar. 54,787 62,546 11.818 
-
-
-
Apr. 56,867 40,571 28,114 
-
-
-
may 26,751 46,129 8,736 
-
-
-
June 32,618 19,995 21,358 
-
1982 1-6 241,934 245,869 21,358 
-
-
- 21,358 241,934 
-
- -
Source: Introduction to the Korean Securities Market, 1982.
Table A19: BOND TRADING UNDER REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS
Repo Transactions
Unit: Mil. Won
Repo Sales Repo Purchase Repo Outstanding
Secondary Bonds
Total Market Tertiary Outstanding
Year & Month Sale Repurchase Balance Purchase Resale Balance Outstanding Activity Activity (M)
1981 12 185,592 45,245 230,837 7.42
1982 1 161,829 124,162 223,259 41,634 22,827 64,052 - 203,46D 146,989
2 160,393 116,147 267,505 62,065 34,181 91,936
3 236,270 190,704 313,071 87,840 70,416 109,360
4 190,690 161,685 342,076 83,433 66,650 126,143
5 190,049 172,041 360,084 59,786 72,495 113,434
6 240,838 177,826 423,096 100,755 70,990 143,199
7 216,369 172,890 466,575 103,181 98,174 148,206 1
8 216,686 178,717 504,544 66,429 78,534 136,101 X
9 253,338 260,821 497,061 72,917 93,226 115,792 612,853
10 211,834 242,621 466,274 67,797 89,769 93,820
11- 279,752 235,978 510,048 48,749 56,485 86,084
12 345,925 33,795
1982 2,703,973 2,322,325 567,240 838,381 806,195 67,429 634,66.9 3,532,351 3,128,706 15.38
1983 1 327,772 250,638 647,072 87,556 89,408 115,559
2 334,477 256,038 725,511 75,919 96,780 94,697
3 359,045 320,444 764,112 49,544 105,737 38,504
4 32i,922 283,512 802,522 41,430- 36,711 43,223
5 362,812 312,865 852,469 84,402 73,291 54,334
6 343,705 330,551 865,623 84,465 86,998 51,801
7 253,608 217,365 901,866 75,991 76,575 51,217
8 272,533 227,151 947,248 79,417 86,209 44,425
9 303,724 272,320 978,652 76,648 81,295 39,778 1,018,430 19.86
Rate of 81-12 to 82-12 205.6% 49.0% 174.9%
Growth 82-9 to 83-9 63.9%
Source: Monthly Review, Securities Supervisory Board, Korea.
Table A20: NET PURCHASE AND SALE OF REPO BY INVESTOR
Unit: Mil. Won
Sold Purchased
Other Balance Listed Securities Other Balance
K.S.F.C. Bank Corps. Individuals = Total Companies Firms Corps. = Total
End of
1982 1 5,844 668 25,134 191,613 223,259 62,994 1,058 64,052
2 13,222 668 29,910 223,705 267,505 90,378 1,558 91,936
3 11,841 569 35,009 265,651 313,071 107,914 1,446 109,360
4 28,342 - 26,425 287,310 342,076 124,093 2,050 126,143
5 8,591 - 29,204 322,288 360,084 111,961 1,473 113,434
6 16,752 - 31,609 374,736 423,096 140,726 2,473 143,199
7 31,820 - 34,164 400,591 466,575 142,753 5,453 148,206
8 42,283 - 37,525 424,735 504,544 131,678 4,423 136,101
9 47,247 - 37-,097 412,717 497,061 114,370 1,422 115,792
10 45,242 - 32,377 388,655 466,274 93,071 749 93,820
11 51,944 - 69,753 388,351 510,048 85,133 951 86,084
12
1982 49,981 - 118,665 398,594 567,240 67,033 - 396 67,429
1983 1 46,808 - 137,390 462,874 647,072 65,102 46,811 3,646 115,559
2 39,196 - 184,863 501,452 725,511 55,297 39,199 201 94,697
3 5,238 - 220,605 538,269 764,112 32,621 5,240 643 38,504
4 22,773 - 233,913 545,836 802,522 19,956 22,773 494 43,223
5 31,507 - 264,655 556,307 852,469 19,888 31,507 2,939 54,334
6 34,936 - 269,307 561,380 865,623 12,457 34,936 4,408 51,801
7 32,493 - 280,778 588,595 901,866 12,353 32,493 6,371 51,217
8 32,703 - 289,529 625,016 947,248 6,101 32,703 5,621 44,425
9 31,321 - 302,335 644,996 978,652 4,684 31,321 3,773 39,778
Note: 1) Repo Sales of the banks are included from Oct. 1982.
2) Repo Transactions of the K.S.F.C. are included from Jan. 1983.
TABLE A21: SECONDARY MARKET ACTIVITY: STOCKS (MI WON)
A B C D 8 F G H I
During Sale Value of Corporate Trade in Total (A-B) x 100 C-D f of old shares Av. hold of G/H
Listed Stocks Funds Raised Exist Market Value Average Karket Value A Sold-FxSV listed shares (M)
1969 42,030.17 6,099 35,931.17 86,569.42 47.6 85.47 84.176 127,95 822 .07
1970 42,873.78 7,151 35,722.78 97,922.55 38.73 83.32 65.968 150,003 478 .04 1
1971 34,376.36 2,940 31,436.36 108,706.13 30.43 91.45 46.202 164,588.432 .03 Co
1972 71,050.05 14,813 56,237.05 245,980.70 31.71 74.15 67.032 189,983.38 .04
1973 160,642.18 51,098 109,544.18 426,246.66 32.59 68.19 88.694 295,646.000 .03 1
1974 179,427.74 46,417 133,010.74 532,826.81 27.74 74.13 116.646 396,328.129 .03
1975 333,906.16 122,806 211,102.16 916,054.11 29.14 63.2 196.334 656,293.007 .03
1976 628,677.62 175,946 452,731.62 1,436,074.01 38.50 72.01 426.158 1204,166.226 .04
1977 1,375,267.77 185,973 1,189,294.77 2,350,835.36 62.81 86.48 1099.577 1850,257.876 .06
1978 1,741,506.35 326,722 1,414,784.35 2,892,511.78 53.96 81.24 1111.726 2538,278.000 .04
1979 1,327,813.14 216,712 1,111,101.14 2,609,414.22 40.39 83.68 1305.933 3233,067.252 .04
1980 1,134,019.25 171,148 962,871.25 2,526,552.58 37.5 84.91 1397.020 3691,193.227 .04
1981 2,534,160.15 306,041 2,228,119.15 2,959,057.13 81.24 87.92 2703.255 3962,035.506 .07
1982 1,973,468.67 276,867 1,696,601.67 3,300,494.23 54.21 85.97 2469.413 4376,890.723 .06
1983!l 1,253,150.06 263.657 989,493.06 3,213,376.85 31
1/ 1983 data is from January to August only.
Sources: Korea Exchange Stock
Introduction to the Korean Securities Market 1982 - KSE
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TABLE A22: RATES OF RETURN IN THE EQUITY MARKET (%)
p /Pt-1/ Yield Rate of Return Corporate
Bond Yields
1974
1975 15.0
1976 1.16 14.0 30 20.4
1977 1.32 14.4 46 20.1
1978 1.06 19.8 26 21.1
1979 0.82 15.7 -23 26.7
1980 0.90 23.9 13.9 30.1
1981 10.97 24.5 21.5 24.4
1982 0.95 16.3 11.3 16.8
1983
Mean 22.8 20.9
Standard Deviation 15.376 4.527
Variance 67.4% 21.7
1/ Ratio of stock market index at end of period t to the index at end of
period t-1.
Source: Securities Statistics Year Book
TABLE A.23: DISTRIBUTION OF SHAREHOLDINGS
(A) No. of Holders (B)3Value.of Shares
No. of Holders Shares in (Thou.)Size of Holding Dec. 1981 June 1982 Dec. 1982 June 1983 Dec. 1981 June 1982 Dec. 1982 June 1983
De. 19. Jue18_2 ue1
Less than 100 169,775 156,683 158,875 147,219 6.536 5,968 5,948 5,378
(0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
100-999 277.476 276,356 276,641 237,290 114,371 113,732 115,366 93,197
(3.0) (2.6) (2.4) (1.9)
1.000-9,999 196,215 193,272 191.367 192,570 635,087 599,899 649,247 705,619
(15.0) (13.7) (13.7) (14.3)
10,000-99,999 48,252 49,318 50,281 49,126 1,306,701 1,352,042 1,376,152 1,226,037
(30.5) (30.8) (29.0) (27.0)
100,000 & sore 4,558 4,995 5,011 5,172 2,181,387 2,320,064 2,606,577 2,804,076
(51.3) (52.8) (54.8) (56.7)
T 0 T A L 696,276 680,624 682,175 631,377 4,244,802 4,391,705 4,753,-290 4,944,307
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
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TABLE A24: OW.fERSHIP OF LISTED STOCKS BY TYPE OF HOLDERS
Type of Holders Shares hold (In thou.) Shares hold (in thou.)
Dec. 1981 June 1982 Dec. 1982 June 1983
Government & State 86,710 86,765 35,636 16,876
Corporations (1.8) (2.0) (0.8) (0.3)
Banking Institutions 239,860 249,838 246,102 281,172
(5.7) (5.7) (5.2) (5.7)
Securities Companies 95,612 112,952 167,183 150,111
(2.3) (2.6) (3.5) (3.0)
Insurance Companies & 1,001,563 1,048,152 1,293,451 1,402,450
Other Corporations (23.8) (23.9) (27.!) (28.4)
Individuals 2,737,902 2,804,212 2,914,027 2,996,245
(64.5) (63.9) (61.3) (60.6)
Foreigners 83,155 89,786 96,891 97,453
(1.9) (1.9) (2.0) (2.0)
T O T A L 4,244,802 4,391,705 96,891 97,453
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
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Table A25: RATIO OF BOOK VALUE OF CAPITAL STOCK
TO REAL CAPITAL IN STEADY STATE
Gross Investment to Real Capital Stock (I/K)
.05 .1 .15 .2 .3
Depreciation .10 .64 .75 .79 .82 .84
Rate (.08) (.13) (.19) (.24) (.36)
.12 .49 .62 .69 .73 .83
(+50%) (.10) (.16) (.22) (.27) (.36)
.14 .39 .54 .61 .66 .72
(.13) (.19) (.25) (.30) (.42)
.16 .32 .47 .54 .60 .66
(+100%) (.16) (.21) (.28) (.33) (.45)
Figures in parenthesis give the ratio of gross investment
to book value of capital stock.
TABLE A26: RATIO OF BOOK VALUE OF CAPITAL
STOCK TO ACTUAL CAPITAL
6 .05 .1 .15- .2 .3
.07 .58 .70 .76 .79 .83
(.09) (.14) (.20) (.25) (.36)
.08 .54 .67 .4- .77 .80
(.09) (.15) (.21) (.26) (.38)
.09 .51 .64 .70 .74 .78
(.10) (.16) (.21) (.27) (.38)
6 /6 ' 1.4 or a - 40%
Figures in parenthesis give the ratio of gross investment
to book value of capital stock.
TABLE A27: DEPOSIT MONEY BANK'S BANKING FUND LANS (PERCENTAGE)
Equipment/ Term Loans/ Term Loans/ Medium Industry/
Total Loans Total Loans Total Loans Total Loan with Banking
end of with Banking Funds wtth Banking Funds vith Banking Funds Funds + Loan with
+ Loans with NIF NIF
1972 10 3 3 1962 6
1973 14 2 2 1963 5
1974 12 1 1 1964 5
1975 13 1 1 1965 4
1976 13 1 1 1966 5
1977 13 2 2 1967 5
1978 14 3 2 1968 3
1979 15 3 3 1969 2
1980 14 4 3 1970 2
1981 14 4 4 1971 3
1982 15 4 4 1972 4
1983-9 15 4 4 1973 3
1974 3
1975 3
General Funds/ Export/Total Loans 1976 3
Total Loans with Banking Funds 1977 4
+ Loans with NIF 1978 4
1979 4
1972 31 10 1980 5
1973 29 15 1981 6
1974 32 16 1982 6
1975 31 12 1983-9 6
1976 27 13
1977 31 13
1978 32 14
1979 28 14
1980 30 15
1981 29 14
1982 31 12
1983-9 29 12
Sources: Nonthly Statistical Bulletin - BOK
Table A28: DIRECTED LOANS OF DMBs
(in billion won, X)
1978 1979 1980 1981
Amount % Amount 2 Amount X Amount 2
1. Banking Funds
A. Total loans 6,019.1 100.0 8,267.7 100.0 11,295.2 100.0 15,350.6 100.0
All Equtpment 818.8 13.6 1,208.6 14.6 1,544.9 13.7 2,615.7 17.0
B. Directed Loans 1,965.8 32.7 2,786.2 33.4 3,966.8 35.1 5,612.4 36.6
BI Equtpment 628.3 10.4 852.3 10.3 1,172.2 10.4 2,047.7 13.3
BI/B(X) 32.0 30.9 29.6 36.5
BI/Al(X) 76.7 70.5 75.9 78.3
Exports (short-term) 1/ 883.2 14.7 1,227.2 14.8 1,720.8 1.2 2,197.2 14.3
Export Industry Equipment 2/ 57.0 42.7 26.2 179.9
Machitm Industry Promotion 3/ 26.1 15.1 10.2 6.2
Special Equipment 35.0 30.1 22.5 15.0
Industrial Rationalization 7.8 7.5 6.3 5.4
Medium Industry 242.1 4.0 371.5 4.5 642.9 5.7 1,000.1 6.5
Agriculture 175.3 2.9 234.6 2.8 313.7 2.8 331.2 2.2
Fishery 66.8 1.1 81.0 1.0 106.1 0.9 138.3 0.9
Housing 381.4 6.3 626.9 7.6 - 938.6 8.3 1,455.1 9.5
Equipment for Energy
Conservation 4/ - - 2.0 94.7 0.6
Others 222.6 3.7 124.6 1.5 177.6 1.6 204.1 1.3
2. Government Funds
A. Total 302.1 100.0 347.4 100.0 503.9 100.0 643.9 100.0
B. Equipment 256.3 84.8 324.4 93.4 469.7 93.2 598.9 93.0
3. NIF Funds
A. Total 287.7 100.0 362.7 100.0 405.3 100.0 487.2 100.0
B. Equipment 273.8 95.2 348.4 96.1 375.6 92.7 421.5 86.5
4. Foreign Currency Loans 1,098.9 1,722.9 2,596.1 2,775.0
Total DBM Loans 7,707.8 100.0 10,707.7 100.0 14,800.5 100.0 19,256.7 100.0
(1+2+3+4)
Total Directed Loans 3,654.5 47.4 5,194.2 48.5 7,472.1 50.5 9,518.5 49.4
(11+2+3+4)
Directed Loans (excluding
Exports-Short Term) 2,771.3 36.0 3,967.0 37.1 5,751.3 38.9 7,321.3 38.2
I/ 90 Day.
2/ 8 Years.
3/ 3-8 Years.
_/ 5 Years.
Source: Bank of Korea
Table A29: NATIONAL INVESTMENT FUND NIF RATIO
CUMULATED REPAYMENT ON CUMULATED NEW LOANS
1974 1975 1976 1971 1978 1979 t980 1981 1982
Loan Rep. Loan Rap. Losn Rep. Loan Rep. LIsn Rep. eoan Rtp. Loan Rep. Losn Rep. Loan Rep.
Purchase of domestic 3,693 26 9.006 274 28.787 1.114 54,184 4.314 68.737 10,198 123,187 20,919 164.200 44,450 228.019 74.142 385,147 107.921
machineries
RATIO S 1 3 2 8 11 17 27 33 28
Constructlion of 7,055 861 16,166 3.287 30,748 4,137 61,228 5,777 106,753 8,711 155,676 16,241 173,335 31,354 194,854 46,836 234,235 60,423
wchinsry factories
2
RATIO S 12 20 13 9 8 10 18 24 26
Planned Shipbuilding - - 3,052 - 138,03 - 29,520 - 49,610 2,830 88,074 6,315 142.658 13,242 239.724 30,042 362,066 47,355
RATIO I - - - - 6 7 9 13 13
Defense Industries 1,944 38 12,419 380 25.006 1.323 38,438 3.721 71,384 9,735 102,364 23,822 141,703 44,054 211,857 72.591 253,049 116,120
RTIO S 2 3 5 10 14 23 31 34 46
Otber beavy & 2,681 - 48,002 1.451 93,669 2,534 141,261 8,509 259,466 14,274 408,805 28,566 522.914 53,287 603.803 96,408 688,313 159.147 0
chemical Industrites
RATIO 2 - 3 3 6 6 7 0o 16 23
Electronic 920 - 1,689 50 2,734 181 3,645 491 10,129 1,037 17,848 2,164 22,936 4,489 24,341 7,623 29.961 11,386
RATIO S - 3 1 3 10 12 20 31 38
Power Industry 17,000 - 60,200 - 100,200 1 340,200 1,700 242,200 8,600 342,200 24,100 462,200 44,680 622,200 79,720 762,200 136,460
RATIOS - - - I 4 7 30 13 l8
Unit Billion Won
Source: Natioaal lnvestaent Fond Statistics
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TABLR A30: LOANS AND DISCOUNTS OF DEPOSIT MONEY BANKS BY INDUSTRY (Z)
Metal Products
Date Construction Manufacturing Textiles Chemicals Machinery
(et.al) (et. al.) & Equip.
1978 9.5 57.8 17.8 8.4 12.2
1979 11.6 56.8 16.3 8.1 13.4
1980 12.5 56.7 15.3 9.0 14.0
1981 12.8 54.2 14.2 9.1 12.5
1982-6 9.9 53.4 13.0 8.3 11.4
1982 10.6 50.3 12.3 8.4 11.9
1983-9 11.7 48.0 11.4 7.8 11.9
Table A31: Land Price Tndex (Rate of Growth)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
(est..
Total 26.99 26.60 33.55 49.98 16.63 11.68 7.51 5.4 20
Major 4.87 21.04 46.67 79.08 21.96 17.02 7.11 5.6 40
Cities
Small 25.84 28.62 34.65 58.78 14.49 14.37 8.63 7.9 18
Cities
Rural 25.92 24.43 25.72 26.69 12.46 8.19 7.12 5.0 13
WPI 19.6 9.4 10.1 12.2 23.8 42.3 11.3 2.4 -0.2
Deflator 24.4 17.9 16.5 20.3 19.3 23.8 18.1 8.0 2.8
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FOOTNOTES
1/ If one were to speculate on precise numbers, the appropriate ratio of
the general bills (or prime) rate, representing the base choice with
which the rate differentiation is to be built to the curb rate is not
likely to be significantly different from 0.5.
2/ Virmani (1982), Section 4.5 or Virmani (1983).
3/ See Virmani (1982), section 3.2 and 4.7, and Appendix.
4/ See Virmani (1982), Section 3.2.
5/ Overdue loans are a special category of low expected return or high
risk loans. The premium for these loans has ranged from 67% in the
third quarter of 1977 to 21% in the second quarter of 1982. For the
10 quarter period before and after first quarter 1980 it was 25% and
32% respectively. Finer differentiation into a B and C categories
(say), could have interest ceilings which were higher than the A
category by 15% and 30% respectively. Overdue loans of one category
could then be subject to the loan ceiling of the next higher category.
6/ I have shown elsewhere (see 1982 & 1984 papers) that this is an
efficient form of intervention if market failure exists.
7/ See my 1982 and 1984 papers (op. cit.), for why a direct interest loan
subsidy (not a ceiling) or a collateral subsidy is an efficient way of
affecting credit allocation.
8/ 1982 paper, op. cit., Chapter 15.
9/ See subsequent discussion on loans with and without collateral.
10/ 1982 Paper.
11/ Op. cit., Sections 6.2 and 7.3.
12/ 1982 paper, Section 3.4.
13/ Inflation is ignored.
14/ See Policy Analysis in Virmani (1982) Section 4.5, Virmani (1983) or
Virmani (1984).
15/ Wijnbergen (1983).
16/ Virmani (1982) Section 7.3. Also see analysis in Appendix.
17/ Virmani (1982), Section 7.2, 7.3 on Adverse Selection.
18/ Figure 7 is in Virmani (1982) Section 2.3. Figure 6 can also be found
in A. Virmani, "Contractual Equilibrium in Competitive Loan Markets",
DRD Discussion Paper No. 43.
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